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     One way a multinational corporation can further satisfy its primary objective, which is 
to maximize shareholder wealth, is to minimize the share of its income that is 
transferred through taxation to the various sovereign nations within which it does 
business.  The profit maximizing firm attempts to maximize (minimize) taxable income 
in those jurisdictions where income tax burdens are the least (most) in such a way as to 
diminish the present value of its global total tax burden.   
     While the US corporate income tax rate has remained relatively stable over the 
decades since most US income tax rates were last slashed as part of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986, across the rest of the world, non-US corporate income tax rates have 
continued to fall.  Even though the US statutory rate was among the lowest corporate 
income tax rates of any industrialized nation in 1988, by 2008, due to continuing rate 
decreases around the globe the US rate had become one of the highest corporate 
income tax rates amongst the G-8.  In April of 2012, the US statutory rate as applied to 
corporate income became the highest among all the Organization for Cooperation and 
Economic Development (OECD) countries.   
     This study will examine the behavior of option intensive corporations during the late 
1990’s.  Coinciding with the longest recorded economic expansion in the history of the 
United States and coupled with the so-called “internet bubble” during the second half of 
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the decade, this period of rapid stock price appreciation was also a time when many 
highly profitable companies faced substantially lower current US tax liabilities due to the 
large tax deductions resulting from the employee exercise of increasing quantities of 
non-qualified stock options at substantial gains.   Enormous tax losses reported by 
employee stock option granting firms were sufficient to eliminate not only current US 
corporate income tax liabilities but also several years of future tax liabilities for some 
firms.   Previous research has documented an increasing proportion of US multinational 
corporate income recognized in foreign jurisdictions, thereby escaping the relatively 
high US corporate tax rates until the foreign profits are repatriated back into the US. 
     Perhaps US corporate income tax rates are so high in comparison to equally 
suitable substitute foreign locations that many firms have relocated their income 
producing activities to lower taxed jurisdictions abroad.  Or it may be that US 
multinational firms engage in various cross border income shifting techniques to avoid 
high US corporate income tax rates and reduce their overall global tax burden.  
Profitable option intensive firms in the late 1990’s faced in effect lower US corporate 
income tax rates due to their extensive employee stock option deductions and resulting 
net operating loss carry-forwards.  It is possible that these firms had more incentive to 
recognize income domestically than their non-option intensive corporate peers.   
     Using a sample of the largest US firms comprising the NASDAQ-100 index on May 
31, 2001, this study found evidence of higher US profitability among NASDAQ-100 
multinational firms with the largest deductions resulting from the exercise of options by 
their employees during the 1997 – 2000 fiscal years suggesting that these firms where 
more likely to recognize or even generate income within US borders when facing 
 iii 
 
 
effectively lower US corporate income tax rates.  Such an observation has potential 
public policy implications and contributes to the literature on tax motivated income 
shifting behavior. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
 
DEDICATION 
 
I dedicate this work to the memory of Dr. James B. “Jim” King, II (1944-2004) 
dear friend, trusted guide and advocate throughout my academic career.  His 
continuous encouragement even near the very end of his battle for life formed my 
inspiration to never give up no matter what life handed to me or my family during the 
PhD program.  I will spend my academic career in part hoping to pay off the debt of 
love and gratitude I owe to him.  It is my prayer, Jim that you are pleased with my work 
and proud of who I’ve become during the process.   
 v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
Without the continuous encouragement and support from my family and wife in 
addition to the guidance I received from my committee members and support I 
depended on from the School of Accountancy, I would never have completed my 
dissertation. 
It is with deep gratitude that I acknowledge the patience, protection and 
unwavering confidence in my eventual success extended to me by my advisor, Dr. 
Raymond Wacker throughout these many years.  Even when I didn’t believe in myself, 
his unwavering confidence inspired my own belief that I could meet this final hurdle.  It 
almost goes without saying that Dr. Wacker is chiefly responsible for my enduring love 
of research, teaching and continuous learning about taxation. 
I also would like to thank Dr. Marcus Odom, who has been a good friend and 
mentor not only as I returned to complete my Ph.D. but also as I made the transition to 
academia.  I would never have reached my comprehensive exams without the help of 
Dr. Jacob Rose, nor would I have been able begin my dissertation project without the 
guidance of Dr. Mark Dibben who visited SIUC from the University of Tasmania.  Many 
thanks also to my fellow PhD student colleagues who also gave critical help over the 
course of my program, Dana O’Dell, IkSeon Suh, Daniel Braswell among others.   
My mother, June was of particular help to me over the entire course of my Ph.D.  
program financially, emotionally and most importantly with her unceasing prayers 
Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Katie.  She stood by me through the best and 
worst times since I returned to Carbondale to finish my Ph.D. We are truly blessed. 
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER           PAGE 
ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................... i 
DEDICATION .................................................................................................................. iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................................................. v 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... vii 
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................ viii 
CHAPTERS 
CHAPTER 1 – Introduction................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER 2 – Literature Review and Hypotheses ............................................. 11 
CHAPTER 3 – Model and Hypothesis Development .......................................... 23 
CHAPTER 4 – Methodology ............................................................................... 31  
CHAPTER 5 – Sample Description .................................................................... 37  
CHAPTER 6 – Results ....................................................................................... 49 
CHAPTER 7 – Conclusions and Implications ..................................................... 59 
REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 65 
APPENDICES  
Appendix A – Firms Comprising the NASDAQ 100 Index on May 30, 2001 ...... 76 
Appendix B – Output from E-Views Statistical Analysis Software Package ....... 79 
 
VITA  ........................................................................................................................... 90 
 vii 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
TABLE             PAGE 
Table 1 .......................................................................................................................... 39 
Table 2 .......................................................................................................................... 43 
Table 3 .......................................................................................................................... 44 
Table 4 .......................................................................................................................... 51 
 
 vii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
FIGURE            PAGE 
Figure 1 ......................................................................................................................... 45 
Figure 2 ......................................................................................................................... 47 
 
1 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
“Why did the corporate chicken cross the border?  Because taxes were lower on 
the other side.” -- Actual bad joke once told in my undergraduate tax course. 
Traditionally the chief purpose of a corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth 
subject to ethical constraints.  Whatever portion of corporate income is paid to the 
government in the form of taxes would seem to defeat that wealth maximizing purpose 
by transmuting corporate wealth into sovereign tax revenues.  Can a corporation 
maximize wealth for its shareholders by minimizing its global tax burden?  Perhaps by 
following that chicken across the national border?  Caeteris paribus even the most 
patriotic All-American chicken, would likely find its wealth maximizing purpose best 
served by crossing the US border into just about any industrialized foreign country 
around the globe to reduce its tax burden and thereby increase after-tax income.  April 
1, 2012 was the effective date of a Japanese corporate tax rate reduction, which left the 
United States at the very top of developed nations in terms of the greatest tax burden 
levied upon corporate income.1  
The United States not only failed to participate in the global corporate tax 
competition but also came in dead last as a result.  The global tax race resembled a 
race to the bottom over the past 30 years as country after country has lowered its 
                                            
1 Joseph Mason, "World's Highest Corporate Tax Rate Hurts U.S Economically,"  U.S. News & 
World Report(2012), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2012/04/02/worlds-
highest-corporate-tax-rate-hurts-us-economically. 
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corporate tax rate (Whalley, 1990; Klassen, Lang and Wolfson, 1993; Devereux, 
Lockwood and Redoano, 2008), while the US has left corporate tax rates essentially 
unchanged since the last corporate income tax rate cut in 1986.2  Those cuts, part of 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 1986), reduced the US corporate income tax rate by 
50% and made the US corporate income tax rate the lowest rate amongst the 
industrialized nations.  In fact, by the time these corporate income tax rate reductions 
became fully effective in 1988, the US Corporate income tax rate was 12 percent lower 
than the average corporate income tax rate for the G-73.  In the years since TRA 1986, 
other developed countries have further reduced their corporate tax rates to levels even 
lower than those in the US, eliminating the competitive advantage to domestically 
sourced income. 
Tax avoidance within the bounds of law is as ethical as it is universal.  A 1934 
opinion by Judge Learned Hand contained the following passage, “Anyone may arrange 
his affairs so that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose the 
pattern which best pays the treasury.  There is not even a patriotic duty to increase 
one’s taxes.  Over and over again the Courts have said there is nothing sinister in so 
arranging affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible.  Everyone does it, rich and poor 
alike and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law 
demands.”4  When it has been cost effective to do so, both corporate and individual 
taxpayers have simply relocated to avoid high tax rates.  In 2007 the state of Maryland 
                                            
2 The only change to the US corporate tax rates since TRA1986 has been a one percentage point 
increase in 1993 (Miller and Kim, 2008). 
3 Liveris, A. N. (2011). Make It In America: The Case for Re-Inventing the Economy. Hoboken, 
New Jersey, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
4 Judge Learned Hand, Gregory v. Helvering 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934). 
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introduced a new millionaire’s tax which increased to 6 ½% the marginal income tax 
rate on annual incomes exceeding $1 million.  According to a CNBC article, that tax rate 
increase resulted in a $1.7 billion reduction in state tax revenues as some of Maryland’s 
most affluent counties experienced population declines.5  Apparently, at least in part, 
millionaires left the state for more tax friendly US locales as Maryland experienced a net 
population decline of 31,000 over the remainder of the decade following this tax 
increase.6  In 2011, the State of Illinois enacted a 45% corporate tax rate increase7 
which prompted Indiana and Wisconsin to organize their own independent campaigns 
intended to persuade businesses to relocate from Illinois to either Indiana or Wisconsin 
and by doing so avoid higher Illinois state taxes8.  These campaigns appear to have 
been effective.  By the summer of 2012, at least 17 companies had plans to move out of 
Illinois into Wisconsin or Indiana according to Wisconsin and Indiana Economic 
Development Corporations9.  Clearly some taxpayers will act to reduce their tax 
burdens as the opportunity arises when perceived benefits outweigh perceived costs.   
One notable feature of the United States tax system is its imposition of tax upon 
the worldwide income of domestic multinational corporations.  Under such a global tax 
system, however, does it make a difference in which nation the income of a US 
multinational corporation is earned, particularly from the standpoint of its US tax 
liability?  At first glance, this global approach to US taxation might seem to make the 
                                            
5 Robert Frank, "In Maryland, Higher Taxes Chase Out Rich: Study," (2012), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/48120446/In_Maryland_Higher_Taxes_Chase_Out_Rich_Study. 
6 ibid. 
7 Douglas Belkin, Lauren Etter, and Ilan Brat, "Illinois Braces for Tax Increases," Wall Street 
Journal, January 13, 2011. 
8 Sean F. Driscoll, "Rockford Falls Prey to Wisconisn Luring from Across the Border," Rockford 
Register Star, June 23, 2012. 
9 Ibid. 
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whole conversation on cross border income shifting appear moot.  This is not the case.  
The income earned by a foreign subsidiary of a US corporation is not subject to US tax 
in most cases until repatriated back into the United States.10  At that point a US 
corporation which repatriates foreign subsidiary dividend income is liable for the full 
amount of US income tax due on the repatriated foreign income less a credit for foreign 
income taxes paid subject to various limits (Abrishami, 2005).  Repatriation of foreign 
sourced income back to the United States is not mandated by law, and some of the 
foreign sourced income earned by US multinational corporations is apparently never 
repatriated nor taxed at the difference between the foreign and generally higher US 
income tax rates (Fritz, Hartzell, Titman and Twite, 2007).  Even if additional US 
corporate income taxes are only deferred for a number of years, from a present value 
standpoint the value of deferral can represent a substantial reduction in overall tax 
expense compared to immediate repatriation or merely earning profits within the US 
(Yang & Jeffers, 2008).  When politicians and pundits refer to tax breaks which 
encourage US corporations to outsource jobs or relocate manufacturing operations 
overseas, I suspect it is in reality this indefinite US tax deferral on most foreign sourced 
income earned by domestic multinational corporations to which they refer.   
Unlike millionaires emigrating from high tax states or firms relocating across state 
borders, a US multinational corporation does not necessarily have to close up shop and 
fire all its employees only to begin anew within the borders of some foreign tax haven to 
effect an overall minimization of their global corporate tax burden--although this is not 
entirely unheard of.  Companies have a large variety of alternative tools with which to 
                                            
10 I.R.C. §862(a) 
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avoid paying the highest corporate tax rates and lower global tax burdens.  Some of 
these methods simply “shift” taxable corporate income recognized by a US multinational 
corporation from higher taxed into lower taxed nations.  A company may attempt to 
maximize (minimize) its revenue and/or minimize (maximize) expenses such as cost of 
goods sold within low (high) tax countries through strategic transfer pricing policies.  
Many of these tax motivated transfer pricing strategies are considered “abusive” by the 
United States Treasury. The Internal Revenue Service has considerable statutory 
latitude to prevent tax evasion under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 482 and the 
corresponding Treasury Regulations which govern transfer pricing between related 
parties.  Nevertheless, the IRS efforts under § 482 are problematic and often ineffective.  
Although GlaxoSmithKline in 2006 did agree to pay a $3.4 billion IRS settlement over a 
transfer pricing dispute, the largest corporate tax settlement in US history (Solomon, 
2007), it was reported by the IRS that estimated tax revenue losses due to abusive 
transfer pricing of $11.2 billion occurred between 1996-1998 (IRS, 1999).  A subsequent 
report by the US Treasury just two years later described transfer pricing abuses 
resulting in estimated lost tax revenue of $53 billion for the year 2001 alone (Milbourne, 
2004).  Other researchers further conclude that IRS efforts to combat abusive transfer 
pricing have become largely and increasingly ineffective, perhaps beginning in as early 
as the 1990’s (Sullivan, 2008; Kleinbard, 2011; Grubert, 2012).   
US Multinational corporations also manage the relative amounts of revenues and 
expenses recognized in domestic vs. foreign jurisdictions by tactically manipulating 
cross border royalty payments to, from and between foreign subsidiaries (Collins and 
Shackelford, 1998), or via cost sharing agreements between affiliated multinational 
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members of a controlled group (Kleinbard, 2011) or also by increasing the investment in 
or utilization of assets in higher taxed countries so as to maximize the tax benefit of 
depreciation or amortization deductions (Harris, 1993).  Additionally, despite interest 
allocation rules for multinational corporations under US tax law, tax motivated 
placement of new debt instruments can still locate interest deductions wherever they 
result in optimal tax benefits for the borrowing corporation (Newberry and Dhaliwal, 
2001).  This non-exhaustive listing of income shifting devices to avoid taxes is in 
addition to the in-exhaustible variety of methods in which firms evade taxes through 
ever plentiful tax shelter arrangements such as foreign LILO’s (lease in lease out 
contracts) and numerous basis shifting transactions to name only two (Young, 2004) out 
of the many thousands of IRS listed and reportable transactions according to the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2011).  Evermore creative strategies to 
minimize global taxes proliferate as fast as tax practitioners can dream them up and 
ostensibly even faster than they can be uncovered by the IRS (Young, 2004). 
Does the current US tax system generate and collect revenues efficiently? The 
efficacy of US tax law, in particular income tax law, may provide a lifetime of research 
questions to study.  What makes a provision of tax law effective?  By one definition, a 
tax law should in fact accomplish its stated objectives, yet achieve them with an 
acceptable level of undesirable side effects (Feldstein, 1999).   
I can no longer remember when I first heard this oft repeated truism, “When the 
government imposes a tax on something, society gets less of it.”  For example, if the 
excise tax on alcohol and cigarettes is viewed as an attempt by government to 
discourage the use of these two hazardous yet legal consumer products, it could then 
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be established that these excise taxes contribute to the decline of tobacco and alcohol 
use within the US over time as the excise tax burden has increased.  However, higher 
cigarette taxes have also resulted in increased smuggling to avoid the tax, according to 
a June 2012 CNN report11.  Other undesirable side effects include unacceptably large 
amounts of excise tax paid by low income smokers whose behavior, according to 
research, is largely unaffected by increased cigarette taxes and who in New York State 
spent a crushing average of 23.6% of family income on cigarettes, up from 11.4% over 
a period of eight years according to a 2012 New York Post article12. 
Despite the fact there are politicians who view income taxes as a method of 
wealth redistribution between citizens; the primary purpose of an income tax is to 
generate government revenue. Unlike an excise tax on alcohol or cigarettes, the 
primary purpose of an income tax is not to discourage income production.  Corporations 
are taxed, but it is not in the public interest to have fewer or uniformly smaller 
corporations.  In addition to generating income tax revenues for the Treasury, profitable 
corporations employ workers and contribute to economic growth.  If a corporate income 
tax rate is so high as to reduce corporate tax revenues by discouraging corporate 
investment, suppressing economic growth or distorting economic incentives, or by 
causing economic deadweight costs or other negative consequences which outweigh 
the benefit of the tax revenues generated, then that corporate income tax rate is 
inefficient (Feldstein, 1995).  John Maynard Keynes noted this idea of tax efficacy with 
the eloquent language typical of his day, “Nor should the argument seem strange that 
                                            
11 Harriet  A. Washington, "Ethicist: Health Bans and 'Sin Taxes' Can Easily Backfire," (2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/08/health/ethicist-public-health-initiatives/index.html. 
12 Patrick Basham and John Luik, "The Great Cigarette-Tax Lie," New York Post, October 8 2012. 
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taxation may be so high as to defeat its object, and that, given sufficient time to gather 
the fruits, a reduction of taxation will run a better chance, than an increase, of balancing 
the budget.  For to take the opposite view today is to resemble a manufacturer who, 
running at a loss, decides to raise his price, and when his declining sales increase the 
loss, wrapping himself in the rectitude of plain arithmetic, decides that prudence 
requires him to raise the price still more;—and who, when at last his account is 
balanced with naught on both sides, is still found righteously declaring that it would have 
been the act of a gambler to reduce the price when you were already making a loss.”13  
As statutory income tax rates increase, the revenues generated by the tax may actually 
decline, as was a consequence of the Maryland millionaire’s tax.  
US multinational corporations, subject to the highest tax rates in the developed 
world domestically seem disposed to reducing their overall global tax burdens by 
recognizing income in low tax countries whenever these firms are properly positioned so 
as to make cross border income shifting possible as well as feasible particularly from 
the cost-benefit standpoint.  Is the US statutory tax rate on corporate income too high in 
comparison to those statutory rates in place throughout the rest of the developed 
nations, resulting in multinational corporations working to avoid or at least postpone the 
payment of US taxes by transferring income abroad?  Might US multinational 
corporations respond to lower US corporate tax rates by refraining from shifting income 
out of the US or even by shifting foreign income to the US?  These are merely two 
forms of the same basic research question this study will investigate.   
                                            
13 John Maynard Keynes, "The Means to Prosperity," (London: Macmillan, 1933; reprint, January 
14, 2008). 
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It may be possible to predict the outcome of a statutory reduction in US corporate 
income tax rates by investigating firms that make extensive use of non-qualified 
employee stock options (ESO’s).  These firms often receive large compensation 
deductions against taxable income when their ESO’s are exercised to buy shares below 
the current market price, which effectively reduces the rate of tax paid on its corporate 
income.  If these option intensive firms are found to recognize a higher proportion of 
their global income in the US while non-option intensive profitable firms facing the full 
statutory corporate income tax rate are recognizing an increasingly larger proportion of 
their income abroad, then it may be possible to draw the conclusion that US corporate 
tax rates have become so high relative to foreign OECD corporate income tax rates as 
to impede US corporate tax revenue collection or even reduce domestic economic 
growth.       
This research fits within the stream of cross boarder income shifting literature 
extending the research stream by examining conditions which might reverse the 
direction of the river of income presently flowing out and away from the US.  By taking a 
novel approach to modeling hypothetical tax rate reductions using a proxy variable 
representing reduced rates of statutory corporate income tax, it is my hope for this study 
to make an incremental yet somewhat unique contribution to the existing literature on 
tax motivated income shifting and to contribute to the bourgeoning public policy debate 
over the direction of any future changes to US corporate tax rates.   
The remainder of the dissertation is to be organized as follows:  Chapter 2 will 
review relevant literature, develop a research model and present testable hypotheses; 
Chapter 3 will outline research methodology, define study variables and finally discuss 
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statistical methods used in hypothesis testing; Chapter 4 will discuss sample selection, 
data collection and present descriptive sample statistics; Chapter 5 will present the 
results of data analysis and empirical testing; then lastly, Chapter 6 will contain a 
discussion of conclusions and implications from this research including areas for future 
study.   
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
“Do Taxes Matter?  If Not, Why Not?  If So, How Much?”14 
BOOK-TAX INCOME GAP 
A simple model of rational economic behavior predicts tax avoidance behavior 
when the expected benefits of avoidance exceed the expected costs (Book, 2007).   
There is evidence that corporate tax avoidance was on the rise in the US during the 
decade of the 1990’s (Plesko, 2004; Desai, 2003).  The February 2000 Economic 
Report of the President reported that annual US aggregate corporate income grew 
113% between 1990 and 1999, while over the same period US corporate tax receipts 
increased by only 71%.15  Over the later part of the decade, 1996-1999 saw pre-tax 
corporate profits rise over 23% while corporate tax receipts grew much more slowly, 
increasing only 7.7% (McIntyre and Nguyen, 2000).  US corporate tax revenues as a 
share of gross domestic product (GDP) at 1.9% trailed the 2.8% proportion collected on 
average by non-US members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) (Keightley and Sherlock, 2012).  This was despite a US corporate 
tax rate which was the second highest within the OECD, the weighted average 
corporate tax rate for non-US OECD countries was more than 7% lower than the US 
                                            
14 (Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001; Scholes, Wolfson, Erickson and Maydew, 2005) 
15 Economic Report of the President, Table B-26, page 337. 
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corporate tax rate of 35% in 200916.  Each of these comparative measures suggests 
mounting deterioration of the US corporate income tax base over the past two decades. 
Broadly, three streams of research contribute to an explanation of corporate tax 
revenues which make up a declining share of a growing base of corporate pre-tax 
income.  Three principal causes for the growing book-tax income difference result from 
both government studies and peer-reviewed academic research include first, a growing 
pervasiveness of corporate tax shelters; second, increased income shifting by 
multinational corporations to reduce taxes and third, the expanding practice of granting 
non-qualified stock option plans as employee compensation.   
TAX SHELTERS 
The U.S. Treasury issued a report in 1999 on the growth of corporate tax shelters 
believed to contribute to the divergence between corporate book and tax income 
(Treasury, 1999).  The 1999 Treasury report is consistent with academic research 
finding evidence of increasing corporate tax evasion through the use of various 
reportable transactions to shield corporate income from tax (Mills, Newberry and 
Tautman, 2002; Desai, 2003; Plesko, 1999).  The archival stream of academic research 
on abusive tax sheltering activity is somewhat thinner than other research streams 
examining components of the divergence between corporate book income and tax 
income in part due to the difficulty in obtaining firm level data which often includes IRS 
tax-return data accessible only under special IRS agreement.  In addition, the further 
difficulty of even conceptualizing corporate tax avoidance makes measurement of its 
                                            
16 "The President's Framework for Business Tax Reform,"  (The White House and Department of 
the Treasury, 2012). 
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magnitude imprecise and even subjective (Slemrod, 2004b).  Not all corporate tax 
shelters are explicitly illegal and there exists no way to distinguish with clarity between 
tax avoidance which is generally legal and tax evasion which is illegal.  Any line drawn 
between the criminal and the aggressive must be drawn through grey area of 
indeterminate width within which lawyers argue and courts ultimately decide.   
As new tax shelters are created and implemented, the IRS works to discover and 
identify each new abusive tax shelter to become one of the thousands of reportable 
transactions listed by the IRS as belonging to the type requiring disclosure and 
subjecting the corporate taxpayer to elevated scrutiny and the likely denial of any tax 
benefits received.  Yet in spite of reduced US corporate tax rates within TRA 1986, tax 
shelters have grown more attractive to many corporations as the transaction costs 
associated with tax shelters have declined along with the expected value of possible tax 
penalties, the risk of facing an IRS audit having fallen precipitously (Treasury, 1999).    
At first glance evidence on the growth of corporate tax shelters could lead to the 
conclusion that corporate tax sheltering activity has been on the increase for many 
years.  The “tax gap” estimate of taxpayer non-compliance, which includes explicitly 
illegal forms of tax evasion, while increasing in absolute dollars has nevertheless, 
remained a constant percentage of the estimated total taxes legally due.  Estimates of 
the annual difference between total taxes due under applicable statutes compared to 
the dollars actually paid increased between 2001 and 2006 according to Treasury 
estimates from $345 billion to $450 Billion (Slemrod, 2007; Mazur and Plumley, 2007) 
while the expected percentage of tax compliance had remained statistically unchanged 
at about 83% in both 2001 and 2006 (Treasury, 1999).  In fact, the percentage estimate 
14 
 
 
 
of taxpayer compliance has remained relatively stable since 1973 when the tax gap 
statistics were first published and the proportion of tax compliance also stood at about 
83% (Treasury, 1988).  As an aside, it is interesting to find that IRS estimates of tax 
non-compliance specifically exclude the types of illegal activities which comprise a 
considerable proportion of the US underground economy including for example drug 
dealing, prostitution, illegal gambling.    
INCOME SHIFTING 
Other research has addressed cross border income shifting since the US tax rate 
reductions in TRA 1986.  Foreign operations as a proportion of total activity by US 
multinational firms have increased since the mid 1990’s (Grubert, 2012; Sullivan, 2008; 
Bauman and Schadewald, 2001).  Even more striking than increased globalization on 
the part of US businesses is the even greater proportion of worldwide income that is 
reported to have been earned outside the US by these companies (Grubert, 2012).  The 
share of worldwide income earned abroad has been growing among US multinational 
corporations since at least 1996 growing disproportionately larger than related 
expansion of foreign business activity or increased foreign sales reported by 
multinational firms since 1996 (Sullivan, 2008).  Studies of income shifting using cross 
sections of aggregate national level data to test for evidence of income shifting by US 
multinational corporations consistently report evidence of income shifting to reduce 
global tax burdens.  Bureau of Labor Statistics data on cross border trade between 54 
countries over the period 1997-1999 was examined to find a statistical relationship 
between a countries relatively lower tax rate which was associated with less volatility in 
export transfer prices; export prices which were found to be significantly lower than 
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similar export price levels between unrelated parties (Clausing, 2003).  An analysis of 
manufacturing industry data for 1979-1997 within 22 OECD countries found significant 
evidence of cross border income shifting in response to changing national average tax 
rates.  The authors estimated that as much as 65% of the potential increased revenue 
resulting from a tax increase is subsequently lost due to income shifting (Bartelsman 
and Beetsma, 2001).  Another study of multinational export prices from 2006 using US 
Customs data taken from documents tracking US export transactions for an eight year 
period beginning in 1993 found that intrafirm export transfer prices were more than 50% 
lower on average than similar prices charged by the same firm to unrelated parties 
(Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2006) consistent with the results found by Clausing 
(2003).  In addition, Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) found a negative relationship 
between the destination countries income tax rate and the reduction in price levels 
between related firms.  Companies were also found to reduce intrafirm prices in 
response to increase import tariffs.  It is estimated based on this research that transfer 
price manipulation by US multinational firms in 2004 cost the US Treasury as much as 
$5.5 billion in corporate income tax revenue (Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2006).  
Taken together, these studies of national level data show consistent evidence of 
international income shifting out of the US through transfer price manipulation to reduce 
US tax burdens on global income.   
The evidence of tax motivated income shifting resulting from the analysis of firm 
level data provides less consistent evidence of the incidence of income shifting behavior 
vs. the national level data among US multinational firms but does allow for certain 
conclusions to be drawn concerning the specific mechanisms employed by multinational 
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corporations to shift income into lower taxed foreign countries and minimize their US tax 
liabilities.   
Using actual corporate tax return data, it is estimated that in 1988 US 
manufacturing firms shifted $7.7 in income before taxes to their foreign subsidiaries 
using a model that assumes equal rates of after-tax return amongst affiliated members 
of a US consolidated group (Rousslang, 1997).  Two research papers in 1993 found 
evidence of tax induced income shifting in the years immediately following TRA 1986 
(Harris, 1993; and Klassen, Lang and Wolfson, 1993).  Harris (1993) made comparisons 
of international firms to purely domestic firms in terms of tax expense and pretax 
income.  Klassen, Lang and Wolfson (1993) examined changes in foreign and domestic 
income subject to tax to conclude that multinational firms participated in tax motivated 
income shifting.  In the years immediately following the US corporate rate reductions of 
TRA 1986, as the US was the low tax jurisdiction among developed nations, it is not 
surprising to find much of the income shifting evidence for the remainder of the decade 
of the 1980’s pointing to US multinational corporations shifting income into the US to 
take advantage of relatively low corporate income tax rates among developed nations 
subsequent to TRA 1986.  Due in part to a 2 year phase in of the new lower tax rates 
beginning in 1987 combined with the creation of the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) 
regime within TRA 1986, alternative explanations for the results presented in 1993 by 
these two post TRA 1986 studies cause their evidence of income shifting to seem 
inconclusive (Shackelford, 1993).  In 1996, however by examining worldwide tax 
burdens and difference in reported profitability between domestic and foreign 
corporations more reliable evidence of post TRA 1986 income shifting is found among 
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firms exhibiting higher volumes of intrafirm cross border transfers in two samples of firm 
data covering two years each beginning in 1982 and 1988.  The author chooses these 
two periods around but not including the passage and implementation of the tax law 
changes in TRA 1986 (Jacob, 1996), improving upon the quality of conclusions made 
about post TRA 1986 income shifting evidence drawn from the earlier inconclusive 1993 
research.  Taken together, the results of these studies of both national level and firm 
level data present relatively strong evidence from which to conclude that US 
multinational firms shift income across national borders motivated by the desire to 
reduce overall global tax burdens. The remainder of the income shifting literature 
reviewed herein attempt primarily to descriptively analyze common attributes of income 
shifting firms while presenting evidence of other income shifting methods in addition to 
tax motivated transfer price management which may also enable US multinational firms 
to avoid recognizing income in those nations with relatively high corporate tax burdens. 
By replicating the Jacob (1996) study after hand collecting much of the missing 
information within the sample of firm year observations drawn from Compustat data, 
researchers were able narrow the prevalence of post TRA 1986 tax motivated income 
shifting to the top eight sample deciles determined by firm size (Conover and Nicoles, 
2000).  This firm size effect has been documented in other income shifting research 
(Rego, 2003; Klassen, Lang and Wolfson, 1993) along with a transactional volume 
effect (Grubert, 2003; Clausing, 2003; Bartelsman and Beetsma, 2001) which suggest 
economies of scale which make possible increased tax motivated income shifting.   
Other research that examines income shifting using methods other than cross 
border income shifting has found evidence of income shifting increasing along with 
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measures of “firm flexibility” according to Harris (1999).  So called highly flexible firms 
must have sufficient expenses such as advertising or interest which can be relocated to 
alternate tax jurisdictions without prohibitive transaction costs.  Research in 2001 found 
that tax incentives influenced the location of interest deductions as a mechanism of 
income shifting to lower global tax burdens (Newberry and Dhaliwal, 2001).  Evidence 
has been found pointing to income shifting through the manipulation of interest 
payments as well as dividend and royalty payments between members of an affiliated 
group for the use of intangibles (Collins and Shackelford, 1998).  In related research 
involving intangibles, Grubert (2003) found that corporate tax rates at the high and low 
extremes of the global distribution had a tendency to attract manufacturing firms with 
large research and development expenditures.  His results suggest that either very high 
or very low tax jurisdictions are attractive to these firms because a large volume of 
transactions involving research and development allows firms to mitigate high tax rates 
or increase the benefits of low tax rates through income shifting (Grubert, 2003).  
Multinational firms with deferred tax assets in the form of net operating losses carry 
forwards are also demonstrate greater flexibility with a propensity to shift income and 
recognize within the US a larger share of worldwide earnings (Newberry and Dhaliwal, 
2001).  Finally, it is possible to recognize more income within a lower taxed country by 
what is termed “real” income shifting (Clausing, 2009).  In this study, Clausing (2009) 
attempts to separate “financial” income shifting which involves primarily the pricing of 
certain transactions between affiliated group members from “real” income shifting. 
Both tax motivated transfer pricing and tax motivated manipulation of the location 
of and rents charged for the use of intangible assets or on interest payments on loans 
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made to affiliate members within a multinational consolidated group are examples of 
financial income shifting while for this study, so called “real” income shifting involves 
relocating the actual productive activity of a US multinational corporation to a lower 
taxed international jurisdiction (Clausing, 2009).  To operationalize “real” income 
shifting, changes in the scale of employment within national borders serves as a proxy 
for the differences in overall scale of “real” operations within national borders.  Since 
“real” operations are not as flexible in terms of the ease to which they can be relocated 
with low transactional costs between countries to facilitate cross border income shifting, 
it is not at all unexpected that measures of “real” income shifting were related far less 
significantly to cross sectional variances in national tax rates than were measures of 
“financial” income shifting measures which exhibited a much higher sensitivity to 
multinational tax rates.  The income shifting literature points to the existence of 
widespread cross border income shifting motivated by opportunities to reap substantial 
financial benefits which accrue to income recognized outside the US.  These benefits 
have grown larger as function of corporate tax rate differentials between the US and the 
other OECD nations, tax rates which have incrementally and increasingly diverged over 
the past two decades.  At the same time, a variety of factors have resulted in declining 
transactional costs and reduced risks of penalties associated with income shifting 
intended to reduce corporate tax payments.  Once again the empirical evidence for 
income shifting is consistent with a simple model of rational economic behavior on the 
part of multinational corporations that are wealth maximizing tax minimizers to the 
degree that opportunities exist to engage in tax motivated income shifting where the 
expected savings from both a reduction in global tax liability and lower present value 
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cost of taxes deferred over an essentially unlimited period of time proceeding 
repatriation back to the US which continue to exceed the expected value of all costs 
both explicit and implicit attributable to income shifting across national borders.   
The tax cost to repatriate foreign income back to the US has steadily increased 
as foreign corporate income tax rates have declined relative to US rates over the 
preceding two decades, ignoring any temporary reduction in the cost foreign income 
repatriation resulting from the limited availability of any tax holidays.  Therefore the tax 
competition which continues to occur between developed countries, coupled with the 
growing levels of income shifting by US multinational firms seeking to benefit from lower 
foreign tax rates is the likely cause of evidence that firms to avoid the high tax cost of 
earnings repatriation by maintaining large overseas accumulations of cash on their 
corporate balance sheets (Foley, Hartzell, Titman and Twite, 2007).  This conclusion is 
based on their investigation of cash holdings within a sample of nearly 35,000 
observations on firms with $100 million in total assets over the years 1982-2004 which 
limited to US corporations outside of the regulated utilities and financial services 
industries.  The extent of foreign cash holdings representative of US multinational 
income that has not been repatriated and thus not subject to US tax on worldwide 
corporate income further contributing to the eroding US corporate tax base and 
contributing to the evidence supporting a theory that US corporate tax rates are so high 
in comparison to non-US OECD nations that the corporate income tax at current rates is 
inefficient both in terms of distorted economic incentives as evidenced by the 
disproportionately large foreign cash holdings by US multinational firms and in terms of 
the ability of the US corporate income to generate income evidenced by falling 
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corporate tax receipts during a period of growth in corporate pretax income at a time the 
US has among the highest tax rates on corporate income relative to other developed 
nations.     
NON-QUALIFIED STOCK OPTIONS 
The final research stream which contributes to the understanding of aggregate 
growth rates for corporate pre-tax income far in excess of the rate of growth in 
aggregate corporate taxable income since at least the mid-1990s relates to the tax 
treatment of nonqualified employee stock options, the use of which began to explode in 
the mid-90s, concurrent with the beginning of these dramatic increases observed in the 
gap between corporate book income and reported corporate taxable income.  
Researching these nonqualified options provided evidence documenting the extent to 
which many firms have reduced, or even eliminated their entire tax liabilities as a result 
of deductions relating to the exercise of nonqualified stock options by their corporate 
employees (Hanlon and Shevlin, 2002; Graham, Lang and Shackelford, 2004).  The 
estimated tax benefit of tax deductions resulting from the recognized gains by employee 
option holders upon exercise grew over 100% from $27.6 billion to $56.4 billion annually 
over the years 1998 to 2000 (Sullivan, 2002) representing not only the growth of stock 
option compensation which saw a rise in the number of employees receiving 
compensation partially in the form of stock options beginning early in the decade of the 
1990’s with approximately one million employee stock options recipients while 
approximately 7-10 million corporate employees were granted these non-qualified 
options by early in the first decade of the 21st century.  These millions of additional 
employee stock options recipients, by the early 2000’s were growing to encompass a 
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more diverse collection of employees beyond just the members of upper management 
(Sullivan, 2000).  Subsequent research in this area found evidence that the tax benefits 
of options exercise were of sufficient magnitude to influence the optimal capital 
structure17 among firms which exhibited the most extensive use of employee stock 
options during the latter part of the decade of the 1990’s.           
                                            
17 The theory of optimal capital structure has a long history beginning with seminal research in 
1958 and 1961by Modigliani and Miller.  The theory posits the existence of an optimal capital structure 
which includes debt at levels sufficient to result in equilibrium between the tax benefits of deductible 
interest payments upon corporate debt and the costs associated with the risks of increased leverage.    
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CHAPTER 3 
MODEL AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT          
It is likely that companies substitute between debt and other tax shields such as 
amortization and depreciation or investment tax credits as the firm seeks its optimal 
capital structure (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980).  Graham, Lang and Schackelford 
(2004) find evidence that non-qualified stock options do act as a substitute tax shield in 
place of debt, which may offers an explanation for the perplexing case of very large 
profitable US firms which contain little or no debt within their capital structures.  While 
there may be substitution between available corporate tax shields for a firm seeking its 
optimal capital structure according to the current literature, it seems evident that all tax 
shields are not created equal.  As a substitute form of corporate tax shield and at least 
from the corporate point of view, the favorable tax treatment afforded nonqualified 
corporate stock options comes as near to statutory perfection as has ever been 
achieved.   In addition to realizing compensation deductions for compensation that was 
neither paid nor charged against corporate income upon option exercise, the 
corporation receives in cash the option strike price from the employee upon option 
exercise.    
Other corporate tax shields have a cost to the corporate recipient of the tax 
benefit, a cost that in absolute terms generally outweighs the tax benefit received18.  For 
example, the tax benefit of deductible interest at current US statutory corporate income 
tax rates results in tax benefits of only $.35 for each $1.00 paid in tax-deductible 
                                            
18 This is ignoring explicit or implicit non-tax benefits accruing from the use of tax shields, such as 
increased return on equity resulting from leverage as a tax shield.     
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interest.  To receive the tax benefits of depreciation or amortization as a tax shield the 
corporation must to incur the acquisition cost of a depreciable or amortizable asset.  
Conversely the favorable tax treatment afforded to non-qualified stock options results in 
a corporate tax deduction upon exercise for compensation at no real cost to the 
corporate employer.  The amount of gain recognized both as income to the exercising 
employee and compensation expense to the corporation is calculated as the amount by 
which the market share price exceeds the option strike price at exercise.   
Under Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion 25 the financial accounting 
treatment afforded nonqualified stock options granted at or below the money results in 
no income recognition by the recipient employee and no compensation expense to the 
option granting corporation.  The subsequent exercise of the option results in a credit to 
additional paid in capital for the current tax benefit realized from deductions from 
corporate taxable income resulting from stock option exercise.  It must be stated that 
while in theory, each employee stock option exercised is dilutive upon the ownership 
interests of pre-existing shareholders; as a practical matter, these effects are probably 
immaterial.  The number of additional shares issued in satisfaction of options exercised 
are very likely insufficient in magnitude to cause a measurable decline in market share 
price.   
While in form employee stock options may be an alternate tax shield substituting 
for leverage in firms with so little debt on their balance sheets.  In substance employee 
stock options have a rather one sided cost-benefit relationship.  Their usage results in 
the benefit of additional cash along with the potential for corporate tax deductions from 
option exercise without cost.   Therefore I propose that in substance employee stock 
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options result in reduced tax liabilities indistinguishable from the reduction that would 
result from a statutory reduction in corporate income tax rates.  Let Tr be the reduced 
tax rate that ignoring the tax benefit of stock options equates tax liability to the statutory 
corporate tax liability after stock option compensation deduction.  Let Pi represent 
pretax income before option deductions, Od represent the deduction for stock option 
compensation, and Ts represent the statutory tax rate on corporate income respectively, 
then: 
for Pi > Od 
TrPi = Ts(Pi - Od)  (a); and  
TrPi = TsPi - TsOd  (b); and 
    Tr = Ts(1- Od / Pi)              (c)    
For every non-zero amount of tax benefit triggered by the recognition of income 
on the part of employees exercising non-qualified stock options, in amounts insufficient 
to completely offset all income subject to tax at the statutory corporate rate: there also 
exists a hypothetically reduced tax rate which would result in an identically reduced 
corporate tax liability in the absence of any deduction resulting from the exercise of 
employee stock options.       
It might be counter argued that such a reduced tax rate might be computed for 
any corporate deduction which partially offsets income subject to the statutory corporate 
income tax rate.  However, the case of non-qualified employee stock options is unique 
in two ways.  First, as previously discussed these particular compensation deductions 
become available to the corporation at no real cost to the corporation.  Second, the 
amount of tax benefit that ultimately results from the exercise of employee options is 
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exogenous to the corporation.  Corporate tax deductions resulting from the exercise of 
previously granted stock options are triggered by the external actions of current or 
former corporate employees who are individually attempting to maximize their own 
personal wealth, rather than by any endogenous corporate desire to maximize 
shareholder wealth or minimize tax liabilities.  Also exogenous is the amount of the 
resulting deduction for compensation expense that becomes available to the corporation 
upon the exercise of non-qualified employee stock options.  While the strike price is 
chosen by the options granting corporation endogenously, it is most likely set at the 
market share price on the grant date.  The amount of compensation expense deduction 
available to the corporation is an exogenous function of the market price per share upon 
option exercise occurring on a day chosen externally by the option holding employee.  
While the corporation has control over the terms and timing of its initial grant of stock 
options to its employees, any potential future reduction in corporate income tax liabilities 
resulting from an option grant to employees is of uncertain likelihood as well as 
unknown magnitude.  Non-qualified stock options granted to corporate employees 
under the financial accounting rules that existed before 2004 in their substance result in 
exogenous tax effects similar to a statutory reduction in corporate rates, more similar 
than the costly alternative tax shields options resemble in form.     
As the result of this substance over form argument, this study will treat stock 
option deductions occurring within the sample population of corporate firm years as a 
proxy variable for a hypothetical reduction in the statutory corporate tax rate applicable 
to corporate taxable income to individual firm year observations as if the applicable 
statutory rate for each firm year was both stochastic and continuous, in stark contrast to 
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the actual statutory corporate income tax rate which is constant over the entire sample 
period.   
The general research questions proposed in the introductory chapter can now be 
viewed in the light of the findings reported within this review of the existing literature 
above.  Those questions were as follows.  First, is the US statutory tax rate on 
corporate income so high compared to statutory rates over the rest of the developed 
world as to induce multinational corporations to avoid or at least postpone the payment 
of US taxes by transferring income to relatively low taxed nations?  Alternatively, might 
US multinational corporations respond to lower US corporate tax rates by not income 
shifting or even by shifting foreign income back into the US?   
First, based on the simple model of rational economic behavior which takes into 
consideration the relationship between expected costs and benefits to predict corporate 
behavior, I would expect to find evidence suggesting that high corporate tax rates would 
be associated with a greater degree of tax avoidance through the use of corporate tax 
shelters.  While the literature documented declining expected costs to engage in a tax 
shelter, the expected benefits of sheltering income from US taxes remain relatively 
unchanged since the mid 1980’s as US taxes are not intrinsically high at current levels.  
Due to US corporate income tax rates which remain largely unchanged since TRA 
1986, the expected benefits of participation in a corporate tax shelter remained 
unchanged which might provide some explanation for the stability of the approximate 
83% expected rate of tax compliance over the past two decades.  However, stable tax 
rates are insufficient to explain the continued 83% estimated compliance rate as this 
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rate is also relatively unchanged since the first 83% estimate was published in 1973, a 
time when corporate tax rates were two times the rates passed in 1986.   
Income shifting researchers found evidence of income shifting into the US by 
multinational corporations to take advantage of relatively low US tax rates in the late 
1980’s as compared with relatively higher tax rates in other developed nations.  The 
literature exploring multinational income shifting presents evidence, however of tax 
motivated income shifting out of the US over the past two decades subsequent to the 
1980’s.  This research culminates in a study which documents the disproportionate 
amount of cash accumulations within the foreign subsidiaries of multinational firms due 
to the high tax costs of repatriation of the increasing share of income shifted and 
reported as earned in foreign jurisdictions.  Looking at national level data for the 
aggregate of US multinational corporations there seems to be strong evidence 
consistent with income shifting and for ruling out the alternate suggestion that higher 
overall levels of profitability are experienced outside of the US.  In addition the 
increasing share of foreign income as a share of global US multinational corporate 
income was in excess of amounts that might be explained by increased global 
profitability rather than income shifting into lower taxed jurisdictions abroad.  If the 
relatively high rates of tax on US corporate income drive the recognition of income 
abroad that follows that the relatively high US corporate rates provide one explanation 
for US corporate tax system that has become increasingly inefficient in terms of its 
ability to generate corporate tax revenue even marginally proportionate to the growth of 
US corporate income. Therefore one might conclude based on current literature that 
while in an absolute sense, US corporate income tax rates have remained essentially 
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unchanged over the past 25 years, the efficiency of existing statutory corporate income 
tax rates has declined based on the reduction of corporate tax revenues collected as a 
share of a growing base of corporate pretax income, and that this decline in US 
corporate tax efficiency might be the result of tax rate changes in the rest of the 
developed world, which have made US rates relatively high in comparison.   
This relative rate differential increases the expected benefit of shifting income out 
of the United States and deferring indefinitely the tax cost of repatriating foreign income.  
Repatriating foreign profits to the US causes a “second level” of corporate income tax 
above foreign taxes paid in most cases, in the form of US corporate tax applied to 
repatriated income at a rate approximately equal to the excess of US income tax rates 
over foreign rates paid upon the foreign income, foreign rates that are in all likelihood, 
lower than US rates.  Although the two general research questions mirror each other, it 
is the second question which asks how companies might react if US statutory tax rates 
on corporate income were lowered in terms of a reversal in the overall direction of 
income shifting or perhaps decreased incentives to shift income outside the US at all. 
Both possible scenarios would result in an increased amount of taxable income reported 
as earned within the US.  This discussion of the current literature viewed under the light 
of the simple model of rational economic behavior leads to the following testable 
hypotheses: 
H1: Firms experiencing greater tax benefits from the exercise of employee stock 
options, will exhibit greater domestic taxable return on assets and/or sales inconsistent 
with typical income shifting away from the US and into lower taxed developed countries.   
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H2: Firms without foreign operations which experience greater tax benefits from 
the exercise of employee stock options, will exhibit less domestic taxable return on 
sales and/or assets than their multinational counterpart sample firms which would be 
consistent with the multinational firms shifting additional foreign income into the US.   
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
It is problematic to make direct observations of income shifting within firm level 
data (Harris, Morck and Slemrod, 1991).  Instead researchers have looked at the likely 
influence income shifting would have on other easily observable variable thought to be 
correlated with shifted income so that this alternative correlated variable can serve as a 
proxy measurement of the unobservable level of shifted income (Gruber and Mutti, 
1991; Hines and Rice, 1990).  One such model to indirectly measure shifted income 
begins with a linear function of US tax liability developed within in a study of 
international income shifting by Harris, Morck and Slemrod (1993) and published as a 
chapter in a 1993 book entitled “Studies in International Taxation” published by the 
University of Chicago Press.  This linear model of current tax liability is given as follows: 
Tu = rU (Yu – Yso + Ysi) 
Tu is the total current US tax liability.  ru is the US statutory rate on corporate income.  
The expression within the brackets represents current reported taxable income and is 
the combination of actual current US taxable income (Yu) less the amount of current 
taxable income shifted out of the US to lower tax countries (Yso) plus the amount of 
current taxable income shifted into the US from higher taxed countries (Ysi).  Only Tu, 
the total current US tax liability is commonly reported by the majority firms according to 
Harris, Morck and Slemrod (1999).  As the US statutory corporate tax rate is also 
known, reported taxable income which is the sum of the three unobservable 
components within the brackets, could be easily calculated.  Therefore, only the 
individual values of these three variable components which together make up reported 
32 
 
 
 
taxable income would still remain unknown.  Individually, these values for multinational 
corporations are generally unobservable.  Harris, Morck and Slemrod (1999) then note 
the following, “A firm’s U.S. income is likely to be roughly proportional to the size of its 
U.S. operations.  . . We want to explain income shifting, Ysi - Yso, using total US federal 
taxes, Tu = rU (Yu – Yso + Ysi).  Dividing the latter variable by the size of US operations 
allows us to interpret variations in the resulting ratio (after controlling for other obvious 
predictors of US taxable income), as due to income shifting.”  The researchers then use 
this model to find evidence of US multinational corporations engaging in tax motivated 
cross border income shifting to minimize taxes during the mid-1980’s.   
My dependent variable in this study of income shifting among option intensive 
firms is adapting directly from the income shifting variable developed by Harris, Morck 
and Slemrod (1999) and discussed above.  Within a more recent sample of firms from 
the latter half of the 1990’s, relatively high US corporate income tax rates on a global 
basis led to my expectation that US multinational corporations would be more likely to 
shift taxable income away from the US so that lower (higher) US taxable return on US 
assets or lower US taxable return to sales would be consistent (inconsistent) with 
income shifting behavior during a later portion of the 1990’s subsequent to aggressive 
tax competition engaged in by non-US OECD nations which further reduced their 
corporate tax rates to levels below the US corporate tax rates set by TRA 1986.     
My independent variable of interest thought to predict income shifting behavior is 
a metric representing the extent of available tax benefits resulting from the employee 
exercise of stock options.  It is expected that stock option deductions which serve to 
proxy for hypothetical statutory corporate income tax rate reductions faced by the 
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individual firms over each annual set of observations will prove to be a significant 
predictor of the dependent variable which is a proxy measure of income shifting.  
Alternative specifications of the option tax benefit variable could have included the 
amount of reduction in effective tax rates (EFT) due to the option deduction.  This 
method was rejected for this study due to the low number of firms that would remain in 
the sample with positive effective tax rates subsequent to the adjustment for the tax 
benefit due to stock option exercise.  Desai (2003) reported that firms make use of the 
entire amount of option deductions even when an NOL is generated in the current year.  
Therefore the total tax benefit of stock options exercised during an annual period has 
spillover affects into future periods which could predict the magnitude of firm cross 
border income shifting activities.  While tax benefits of options upon current tax expense 
are potentially limited by pre-option current tax expense. Marginal tax rates have also 
been simulated to make predictions about firm behavior, however for a study of income 
shifting behavior this method is problematic as its prediction sets up a tautology in that 
the marginal tax rate, the rate of tax upon the next dollar of income earned by a 
corporation is dependent upon the locations in which it recognizes global income. These 
are thought to be predicted by the global rates it faces on its next dollar of income which 
is also a function of the locations it chooses to recognize its global income, and so on.  
So in light of the findings by (Desia, 2003) the natural log of the tax deduction available 
from the employee exercise of stock options will retain the maximum number of firm 
observations and capture all the information contained in the level of stock option 
deductions both currently and upon future fiscal periods. 
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Other variables control for non-tax factors which have been shown to affect 
observed profitability levels in previous income shifting research and contribute to the 
following panel regression equations to be estimated: 
USTUSAtj =  ά + LNDCTESOtj + SIZEtj + FGNRATIOtj + SICtj + YRtj + έtj     (1) 
USTUSStj  =  ά + LNDCTESOtj + SIZEtj + FGNRATIOtj + SICtj + YRtj + έtj    (2) 
Where for firm j in year t = [1997 – 2000]: 
USTUSAtj     =    current US tax expense scaled by US long-term assets 
USTUSStj      =    current US tax expense scaled by non-export US sales 
LNDCTESOtj =    natural log of the absolute dollars of stock option tax deduction 
SIZEtj       =    the natural log of global assets 
FGNRATIOtj  =    the ratio of foreign to global sales, measuring the extent of 
      foreign operations 
SICtj         =    a vector of effects coded industry dummy variables taking 
      values 0 or -1   
YRij   =    a vector of dummy variables indicating fixed effects for 1997, 
      1998 or 1999 
έtj        =     residual 
A significant positive coefficient for LNDCTESOtj, the independent variable believed to 
proxy for hypothetical statutory tax rate reductions, would indicate reduced income 
shifting away from the US and the possibility of income shifting back into the US by 
these firms facing effectively lower tax rates due to their deductions from option 
exercise in support of H1.  Bifurcating the sample into two groups of firms, those with 
and those without foreign operations and then comparing the results of regression 
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estimated separately for each group may then give additional information with which to 
reject or accept H2 which suggests greater increases in US taxable income associated 
with larger stock option deductions among multinational firms which could shift foreign 
income back into the US vs. their purely domestic counterparts.      
The testing of hypotheses as applied to this cross section of 97 NASDAQ-100; j = 
97 firms over a series of 1997-2000; t = 4 annual observations is a matter of discovering 
the degree to which increases in tax benefits resulting from stock option exercise are 
associated with increases in taxable return on assets and or taxable return on sales 
within the US and among US multinational corporations vs. their domestic counterparts.  
Using a method of panel regression which takes into account the annually repeated 
observations for each firm within the cross section will be likely to increase the likelihood 
of finding significant results.  Containing only four years of annual data but nearly 25 
times as many firms within the cross section, a panel method is more appropriate for 
this data than a time series analysis as the latter typically relies on larger values of t in 
terms of repeated measures over time (Gujarati, 1995, pp. 714-718).  Since the values 
observed in the raw data clearly increase over time, a fixed effects model which 
accommodates differences in the linear intercept term over time is my specific choice in 
panel method, which is said to give consistent parameter estimates and is generally 
preferred to a random effects model (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997).   
Serial correlation is a frequent occurrence in financial statement data over 
consecutive reporting periods.  Financial statement observations have strong built in 
relationships to the previous year(s) observation(s) especially when companies 
experience growth over the sample time period (Gujarati, 1995, pp. 400-403).  Although 
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first estimation of this fixed effects model of panel regression will employ the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) model with three (t-1) dummy variables to indicate fixed effects for 
sample firm years (Park, 2009), if Durbin-Watson statistics based on the estimated 
regression residual values lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis of no first order 
serial correlation (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997, pp. 179-182),  a first order 
autoregressive (OLS) model will next be estimated in an attempt to reduce the effects of 
serial correlation.  Further tests will determine the extent of additional violations of the 
OLS assumptions to be addressed.    
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CHAPTER 5 
SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
Sample firms are drawn from corporations which comprise the NASDAQ-100 
index of the largest nonfinancial services industry firms trading on the NASDAQ stock 
exchange.  The starting point for sample selection is the list of firms which comprise the 
NASDAQ-100 index as of May 30, 2001.  Compustat defines a fiscal year as having an 
annual financial statement reporting period ending any time within June 1 of the current 
year through May 31 of the subsequent year.  This means that within Compustat data, 
fiscal year 2000 is assigned to data taken from financial statements with any year-end 
date occurring between the period which begins June 1, 2000 and ends May 31, 2001.  
The firms which comprise the NASDAQ-100 index on May 30, 2001, the end of FY 
2000, along with their ticker symbols are listed in Appendix A.   
NASDAQ firms are chosen for the research sample due to the magnitude of 
stock option tax deductions generated by the employee exercise of nonqualified stock 
options over the last half of the decade of the 1990’s which are the annual periods 
represented within my cross section of firms, 1996-1997.   Prior research involving stock 
option compensation has documented the highest level of stock option intensity within 
the NASDAQ-100 as compared to other stock indices such as the S&P 100 during this 
time period (Hanlon and Shelvin, 2002; Graham, Lang and Shackelford, 2004).  
Graham, Lang and Shackelford (2004) document the degree of stock option intensity 
found within the NASDAQ-100 index of firms, finding evidence for fiscal year 2000 of 
reduced marginal tax rates for nearly all NASDAQ-100 firms compared to their findings 
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of reduced marginal rates occurring for about 25% of S&P 100 firms as the result of 
stock option exercise.   
2-digit SIC industry codes were retrieved for 99 of the 100 index firms for which 
information was available. NASDAQ-100 companies are distributed among 5 of the 10 
defined SIC industry groups and 15 separate industries within these groups as shown in 
Figure 1.  The largest sample concentration of 49 firms is found within just 1 industry 
group, while 82 of the 99 sample firms make up the total number of firms within the 2 
largest industry groups which occur within the sample data.  
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Table 1 
Distribution of Sic Codes Among NASDAQ Firms FY 2000 
   
 
2-digit 
 
Manufacturing Industry Group 
SIC 
CODE 
# of 
Firms 
Apparel and Other Textile Products 23 1 
Paper and Allied Products 26 1 
Chemicals and Allied Products 28 10 
Industrial Machinery and Equipment 35 11 
Electrical and Electrical Equipment 36 23 
Transportation Equipment 37 1 
Instruments and Related Products 38 2 
Group Total 
 
49 
   Transportation, Communication and Utilities 
Group 
  Communications 48 11 
   Retail Trade Group 
  General Merchandise Stores 53 1 
Furniture, Home Furnishings and Equipment 
Stores 57 1 
Eating and Drinking Places 58 1 
Miscellaneous Retail 59 2 
Group Total 
 
5 
   Finance, Insurance and Real Estate  
  Depository Institutions 60 1 
   Service Industries 
  Business Services 73 32 
Engineering and Management Services 87 1 
Group Total 
 
33 
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Data on stock options exercised for sample firms was hand collected from 
individual financial statement footnotes within the annual reports submitted to the 
Security Exchange Commission (SEC) on form 10-K.  Previous researchers have made 
the recommendation that stock option data, in order to achieve an adequate level of 
accuracy, be hand collected from financial statement footnotes rather than estimated 
from cash flow statement entries, when investigating tax benefits from stock option 
exercise (Hanlon and Shevlin, 2002).   Compustat data is not adjusted for any reduction 
in current tax expense nor for reported effective tax rates (Mills, Newberry and 
Trautman, 2002).  Neither are the balance sheet accounts for deferred taxes affected by 
the current tax benefit resulting from option exercise since this particular book-tax 
difference is permanent and never reverses.  Only infrequently to annual reports contain 
sufficient information within the statement of cash flows or statement of changes in 
equity to ascertain the current tax benefit that results from stock option exercise (Hanlon 
and Shevlin, 2002).  Annual reports before 2004 almost universally disclosed the 
granting and exercise of employee stock options only by footnote disclosure under 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 123 and Accounting Principles 
Board (ABP) Opinion No. 25 which allowed for the recording of compensation expense 
equal to the intrinsic value of options granted to employees (Graham, Lang and 
Shackelford, 2004).  Since the typical practice was for the strike price to be set at or 
below the market price on the date granted, non-qualified options granted under the 
pre-2004 rules ordinarily had no intrinsic value which resulted in no compensation 
expense that could be reported on the income statement.   
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SFAS 131 required financial statement footnote disclosure of segment reporting 
information beginning in 1997, which for most firms resulted in disclosure of geographic 
segment data.  Data was hand collected from disclosures of sales and long-lived assets 
attributed to the United States for each firm over the years 1997-2000, one less year 
than of data than for stock option exercise data however the additional year of stock 
option sample data from the year 1996 allows for the creation of lagged tax variables 
related to option exercise.  The overwhelming majority of firms categorized as foreign 
total US export sales including sales attributed to US Foreign Sales Corporations 
(FSC’s).  A small number of firm year observations did not categorize as foreign sales 
their US export sales and comprised less than 5% of firm year observations.  These 
observations were transformed to exclude US export sales from reported US sales to 
maintain consistency across the entire sample for reported amounts of US Sales.   
Remaining data for the sample of NASDAQ-100 firms was collected using 
Research Insight from Compustat.  Missing observations for current tax expense within 
the data retrieved from the Compustat database was supplemented by hand collection 
when possible from the tax footnote disclosures within the annual statements.  Table 2 
contains descriptive statistics for data collected for the cross section of firms within the 
annual periods 1997-2000.  The data takes the form of unbalanced panel data as not 
every firm was in existence for the entire time series 1997-2000, which combined with 
scattered missing values, results in 326 firm year observations with complete data on all 
variables.  Jarque-Bera tests of normality result in extremely high test statistics for all 
raw variables listed resulting in rejection of the null hypotheses of normally distributed 
42 
 
 
 
values.  Table 3 contains descriptive statistics for the regression variables for equations 
(1) and (2).  
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Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics on Data Points over Entire Sample  
(000,000)'s except for Observations  
    
      
 
 ASSETS   GBLNIBT   FSALES   ISOCASH   ISOTAX  
  Mean                     4,351.26  
                    
519.67  
                 
1,015.28  
                   
71.07  
                 
369.59  
  Median                     1,435.73  
                    
116.41  
                    
222.28  
                   
20.24  
                   
51.47  
  Maximum                    98,903.00  
                
15,141.00  
                
19,814.00  
              
1,888.92  
             
13,925.34  
  Minimum                          19.24  
                
(7,439.80)                            -                            -                            -    
  Std. Dev.                    10,730.97  
                 
2,014.78  
                 
2,378.87  
                 
171.77  
              
1,189.62  
  Skewness                            6.04  
                        
4.36  
                        
4.30  
                     
5.95  
                     
7.11  
  Kurtosis                          45.71  
                      
27.63  
                      
26.15  
                   
49.89  
                   
66.64  
      
  Jarque-Bera                    26,763.89  
                
9,274.04  
                
8,283.75  
            
31,791.28  
            
57,751.35  
  Probability   0.000000   0.000000   0.000000   0.000000   0.000000  
      
  Sum               1,418,511.91  
             
169,412.83  
             
330,980.38  
            
23,168.24  
          
120,486.08  
  Sum Sq. Dev.       37,424,933,415.83  
     
1,319,281,837.31  
     
1,839,176,986.52  
        
9,588,550.37  
     
459,940,592.84  
      
  Observations                        326.00  
                   
326.00  
                   
326.00  
                
326.00  
                
326.00  
      
 
 SALES   US LTA   US SALES   US TAX  
 
  Mean                     3,074.37  
                 
1,093.98  
                 
2,059.09  
                 
171.25  
 
  Median                        867.39  
                    
237.20  
                    
516.24  
                   
26.33  
 
  Maximum                    39,090.00  
                
29,816.00  
                
32,177.00  
              
4,744.00  
 
  Minimum                            2.52  
                        
2.46  
                        
2.52  
                
(161.00) 
 
  Std. Dev.                     6,282.98  
                 
3,145.68  
                 
4,357.84  
                 
562.29  
 
  Skewness                            3.43  
                        
6.10  
                        
3.99  
                     
5.42  
 
  Kurtosis                          15.32  
                      
45.76  
                      
21.51  
                   
34.85  
 
      
  Jarque-Bera                     2,700.46  
               
26,859.59  
                
5,517.12  
            
15,381.33  
   Probability   0.000000   0.000000   0.000000   0.000000  
 
      
  Sum               1,002,243.62  
             
356,638.91  
             
671,263.24  
            
55,826.22  
 
  Sum Sq. Dev.       12,829,633,711.81  
     
3,215,964,204.97  
     
6,172,009,337.54  
     
102,754,101.40  
 
      
  Observations                        326.00  
                   
326.00  
                   
326.00  
                
326.00  
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Table 3  
Descriptive Statistics on Regression Variables Equations (1) and (2)  
 
(000,000)'s except for observations 
   
      
 
USTUSLT USTUSSALE LNDCTESO FGNRATIO SIZE 
Mean  0.311001  0.073906  3.934352  0.280378  7.238321 
 Median  0.077463  0.042763  3.963342  0.275153  7.272120 
 Maximum  4.123347  0.590904  9.541465  0.894175  11.50189 
 Minimum -0.167047 -0.326572 -4.674413  0.000000  2.957095 
 Std. Dev.  0.545487  0.100902  2.226712  0.218352  1.531769 
 Skewness  3.090278  1.633767 -0.54437  0.299194 -0.176154 
 Kurtosis  15.13658  8.013420  4.206421  2.133147  3.494836 
      
 Jarque-Bera  2465.549  475.9900  35.10072  14.74714  4.904411 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000628  0.086103 
      
 Sum  99.20925  23.57592  1255.058  89.44057  2309.024 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  94.62293  3.237649  1576.723  15.16151  746.1283 
      
 Observations  319  319  319  319  319 
 
Well over half of the NASDAQ-100 component firms on May 31, 2000 were 
added to the index over the course of the periods 1996-2000.   As the index is 
comprised of the 100 largest NASDAQ traded firms in terms of annual market 
capitalization levels, the fact that 59 firms were recent additions to the index over the 
previous five years might be indicative of high rates of growth with the firms that make 
up the research sample.  Figure 1 contains graphs depicting annual median levels of 
asset, sales and pretax income levels which have grown consistently over the period 
1997-2000.   
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Figure 1. Annual Median Sales, Asset, Pretax Income and Us Tax Levels 1997-2000 
46 
 
 
 
      
The effects of stock options reduced the tax liabilities for most firms within the 
sample grew in magnitude over the period 1997-2000.  Over the entire sample of firm 
years total tax benefit from stock options was 2.14 times greater than the total US 
current tax expense reported by all firms.  For the 81.5% of firm years with positive 
current income tax expense, the total tax benefit of stock options was 1.96 times greater 
than the total US current tax expense reported by this subsample of firms.  After taking 
into account the tax benefit of stock option exercise for each firm year, adjusted current 
income tax expense is positive for only 177 out of 366 firm year sample observations 
containing data.  Figure 2 depicts the annual growth in these option tax benefits on an 
annual basis for the fiscal years 1997-2000. 
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Figure 2. Annual Tax Benefits and Cash Proceeds from Stock Option Exercise 1997-2000  
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Cash generated by employee stock options within the sample also grew in 
magnitude over the sample period.  Over the entire sample, the cash generated by the 
strike price received by firms upon the exercise of employee stock options totaled 31% 
of total net cash flows from financing activities over all annual reports over 385 sample 
firm year observations containing this data.  Annual percentages of cash generated by 
firms from option exercise represented 34.4%, 26.5%, 29.9% and 33.8% of net cash 
flows from financing activities for fiscal years 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000 respectively.  
At the sample median, annual percentages of cash generated by the cash received by 
firms upon option exercise represented 19.1%, 36.0%, 26.0% and 54.3% of net cash 
flows from financing activities for fiscal years 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000 respectively.  
Figure 2 also depicts the growth in total cash received annually by sample firms upon 
the exercise of stock options for fiscal years 1997-2000.   Clearly the exercise of non-
qualified employee stock options represented growing amounts of tax benefits through 
compensation deductions as well as a growing source of cash financing between 1997 
and 2000 for this sample of firms comprising the NASDAQ-100 index at the close of FY 
2000.  For as many of 35 firms out of the total sample of 97 firms, cash generated from 
employee stock option exercise exceeded global net income in at least one fiscal year.  
For 14 firms, cash generated by employee stock options exceeded global net income in 
all four sample years.  It is easy to draw the conclusion that for many of these firms, 
stock options functioned not only as a form of tax shield but also as an important source 
of cash financing.    
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CHAPTER 6  
RESULTS 
The fixed effects panel OLS estimates of the two regression equations resulted in 
the following coefficient estimates with t-Statistics in parentheses: 
USTUSAtj =  0.269280 + 0.062839*LNDCTESOtj + 0.032676*SIZEtj  -0.157536*FGNRATIOtj, 
               (0.843238)   (3.304858)     (1.169638)        (-0.976068) 
sec = 0.494028, R2 = 0.231359; Equation (1) 
USTUSStj  =  -0.008737 + 0.013107*LNDCTESOtj + 0.003506*SIZEtj + 0.091279FGNRATIOtj,  
          (-0.149294)  (3.896417)       (0.703723)            (3.125932) 
sec = 0.091227, R2 = 0.263636; Equation (2) 
Durbin-Watson statistics of 1.207 for the return on sales equation (2) and 1.217 for the 
return on asset equation (1) do not rise above 1.5, the approximate critical value at 
which the null hypothesis of serial correlation among the residuals can be rejected 
(Johnston and DiNardo, 1997, Appendix D).  Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation 
Lagrange multiplier tests also shows highly significant evidence of serial correlation 
among the OLS residuals.  One undesirable consequence of serial correlation among 
the OLS residuals is that parameter estimates are no longer minimum variance which 
results in misleading tests of significance for hypothesis testing (Gujarati, 1995, pp. 409-
415).  Therefore a method to remedy this serial correlation among sample observations 
will be attempted.  The simplest remedial method for serial correlation is to transform 
the OLS model into a first-order autoregressive model through the addition of an 
autoregressive term to both equations (1) and (2). 
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A first-order autoregressive model takes previous residual values into the 
estimation of the current model in an attempt to reduce the negative consequences of 
serial correlation through an iterative process (Maddala, 1992, p. 252).  An iterative 
process is necessary due to the inability to observe the actual preceding residual 
values.  Using the autoregressive model to estimate adjusted equations (1) and (2) 
reduces the influence of serial correlation and improves the estimation of the regression 
equation parameters.   
The coefficient estimates with t-Statistics in parentheses for the first-order 
autoregressive models are as follows: 
USTUSAtj =  0.212234 + 0.046068*LNDCTESOtj + 0.057457*SIZEtj  -0.100385*FGNRATIOtj, 
        (0.504793)   (2.020227)     (1.569782)       (-0.439172) 
sec = 0.458110, R2 = 0.392532; Equation (1) 
USTUSStj  =  -0.051525 + 0.006645*LNDCTESOtj + 0.01404*SIZEtj + 0.081198*FGNRATIOtj,  
         (-0.690444)  (1.753097)       (2.250256)         (2.085992) 
sec = 0.091227, R2 = 0.263636; Equation (2) 
Under the autoregressive models, Durbin-Watson statistics are higher than the 
approximate 1.5 critical threshold level at 2.0267 for equation (1) and 1.9441 for 
equation (2) allowing for the rejection of the null hypothesis of serial correlation among 
the residuals (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997, Appendix D).  In the absence of serial 
correlation, minimum variance parameter estimates allow for more accurate significance 
testing for the rejection or acceptance of the research hypotheses.  However, the 
parameter estimates achieved through the autoregressive model are initially puzzling.  
For both equations (1) and (2) the predictor variable of interest, LNDCTESOtj has for 
both equations a smaller coefficient that has become practically inconsistent for both 
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estimations.  Despite the decline in significance for nearly all independent variables, the 
addition of the autoregressive terms increased the amount of sample variation 
explained by the two models as measured by an increased R2 for the autoregressive 
model.  My first reaction to these results is to suspect another violation of OLS 
regression assumptions, that of no multicollinearity between the independent variables 
(Gujarati, 1995, p 319). One indication of multicollinearity in the regression equation is 
the presence of low t-statistics reported for regression coefficients even while the model 
has good fit to our data with relatively high R2.  Table 4 presents the coefficients of 
correlation between the three metric explanatory variables contained in both regression 
equations.   
Table 4  
Pairwise Correlations among Sample Predictor Variables  
  LNDCTESO SIZE FGNRATIO 
LNDCTESO 1 0.523797 0.126697 
SIZE 0.523797 1 0.106274 
FGNRATIO 0.126697 0.106274 1 
 
The highest level of correlation among variable pairs is between the tax predictor 
variable LNDCTESOtj and the control variable SIZEtj.  The pairwise correlation between 
the two is about 0.52, much lower than 0.8 which would suggest high multicollinearity, 
yet above the minimum value at which multicollinearity is likely to exist (Gujarati, 1995, 
pp. 335-337).  Dropping the control variable SIZEtj from the regression equation could 
solve a problem with multicollinearity if it exists, but might also result in model 
misspecification due to an omitted variable.  Although dropping the control variable 
52 
 
 
 
SIZEtj does in fact result in smaller standard errors and larger t-statistics when this more 
parsimonious model is estimated for both equations (1) and (2), the elimination the 
control variable for SIZEtj is not adequately justified given the relatively low pairwise 
correlation between the independent variables as seen in Table 4, and in light of prior 
research which has documented a size effect for some studies of income shifting.  
Therefore eliminating the control variable SIZEtj would likely result in model 
misspecification absent more evidence to the contrary.  Adding to my confidence in this 
decision not to drop a variable to remedy my possible problem with multicollinearity is a 
discussion of lagged dependent variables by Achen, (2000).  Not all the independent 
variables in the autoregressive model are reported with high standard errors and 
insignificant t-Statistic values as might indicate the presence of multicollinearity.  In fact, 
the most significant independent variable in my autoregressive model is the 
autoregressive term AR(1) , which also has the highest coefficient value among 
predictor variables.  According to Achen, (2000) the addition of an autoregressive leg 
term to regression model has often resulted in an appearance of dominance within the 
model by the autoregressive term as it exhibits a relatively high and very significant 
coefficient value compared to other independent variables contained in the regression 
model.  Such a reduction in both coefficient value and significance upon model 
variables resulting from the introduction of an autoregressive term is due to the 
occurrence of a strong trend within one or more explanatory variables (Achen, 2000). 
One possible solution to this problem cited by Achen, (2000) is from a 1996 
paper which suggests the use of Estimated Generalized Least Squares (EGLS) using 
panel weights to correct for both heteroskedasticity and serially correlated residuals in 
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panel data (Beck and Katz, 1996).  The results of estimating the regression equations 
(1) and (2) using the EGLS method are as follows: 
USTUSAtj =  0.325457 + 0.041090*LNDCTESOtj + 0.27775*SIZEtj  - 0.007588*FGNRATIOtj, 
        (0.858100)   (2.342668)     (1.027165)       (0.042307) 
sec = 1.012382, R2 = 0.144652; Equation (1) 
USTUSStj = -0.010755 + 0.007368*LNDCTESOtj + 0.005135*SIZEtj + 0.03459*FGNRATIOtj,  
        (-0.147976)  (2.356550)     (1.040668)         (2.487883) 
sec = 0.992332, R2 = 0.149019; Equation (2) 
Between the previous estimation of the autoregressive model in this estimation of the 
EGLS model above, the coefficients on LNDCTESOtj changed very little, decreasing 
only 0.005 for equation (1) and increasing only 0.001 for equation (2).  However, the 
coefficients on LNDCTESOtj have substantially increased in significance, approaching 
the .01 level of significance within both equation (1) and equation (2).   How then should 
these results be interpreted? 
For both equations (1) and (2) the coefficients on LNDCTESOtj both have a 
positive sign indicating a direct relationship between the absolute dollar value of stock 
option deductions available to sample firms, and their levels of taxable return on both 
long-term domestic assets as well as to domestic sales.  The coefficient on 
LNDCTESOtj for equation (1), which had as its dependent variable the ratio of US 
taxable income to identifiable long-term US assets, was 0.04.  Interpretation of this 
coefficient is that for every dollar of increased stock option deduction available to the 
firm, the conditional mean of the dependent variable, the ratio of US taxable return on 
US long term assets, could be expected to rise on average by 0.04.  This coefficient is 
significant, although not highly so, falling just short of the 0.01 level (p=0.0198).  The 
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coefficient on LNDCTESOtj for equation (2), which had as its dependent variable the 
ratio of US taxable income to US sales, was 0.007.  Interpretation of this coefficient is 
that for every dollar of increased stock option deduction available to the firm, the 
dependent variable USTUSAtj a ratio of US taxable return to US sales could be 
expected to rise on average by 0.007, holding all other variable constant (Maddala, 
1992, p. 150).  This coefficient is also significant, but not highly significant, falling just 
short of the 0.01 level (p=0.0190).   
There is little doubt that these coefficients are statistically significant in the sense 
that it can be said with confidence that both coefficients are non-zero.  However, is the 
magnitude of these coefficients large enough to suggest that they are of practical 
importance such that H1 can be supported?  Standardized coefficients for LNDCTESOtj 
are calculated by multiplying the coefficient by the ratio of its variable standard deviation 
over the standard deviation of the dependent variable.  Standardized coefficients for 
LNDCTESOtj are 0.22414 for Equation (1) and 0.162598 for Equation (2).  Standardized 
regression coefficients represent the change to the dependent variable measured in 
standard deviations which would result from a one standard deviation increase to the 
value of the predictor variable.  There is not as much variability within the distribution of 
the dependent variable USTUSSjt as compared to the dependent variable USTUSAjt as 
shown in Figure 3.  For this reason a one standard deviation change in LNDCTESOtj 
results in similar amounts of change between the two dependent variables in terms 
standard deviations of change.  The coefficients are much closer than in the 
unstandardized regression however the two standardized coefficients are not 
comparable in the same way as two standardized coefficients within the same equation 
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against the same dependent variable.  Nevertheless, they do give a certain amount of 
comparability in terms of the relative magnitude of influence exerted upon its respective 
dependent variables in terms of the extent of change across the dependent variable 
within my sample.  On that, basis both LNDCTESOtj coefficients from each equation are 
of relative importance in explaining the effect a change in stock option tax benefit has 
on the amount of income a firm recognizes within the US relative to US long term assets 
or US sales.  However, in both equation (1) and equation (2) explain a small portion, 
only 14.9% and 14.5%% of the variation in their dependent measures respectively.   
The next step taken to gather evidence for the testing of hypothesis 2 involved 
the bifurcating of the entire sample into two groups, one of purely domestic firms and 
the other group of multinational firms.  Additional inference might be drawn about cross 
border income shifting engaged in by multinational firms by comparing the regression 
results from that group to a second group of purely domestic firms which have no 
foreign operations with which to shift into US.  Due to the reduced sample size, it was 
not possible to include all the SICtj industry variables without creating perfect 
multicollinearity. The results for equations (1) and (2) estimated upon the multinational 
sub-sample of 76 firms across 259 firm years are as follows: 
USTUSAtj = -0.056233 + 0.053914*LNDCTESOtj + 0.018712*SIZEtj +0.072067*FGNRATIOtj, 
         (-0.19390)   (2.836027)      (0.585462)        (0.310218) 
sec = 1.000609, R2 = 0.068936; Equation (1) 
USTUSStj = -0.027519 + 0.009735*LNDCTESOtj + 0.003022*SIZEtj + 0.092633*FGNRATIOtj,  
        (-0.553324)  (2.921782)    (0.549317)         (2.331821) 
sec = 0.992491, R2 = 0.130861; Equation (2) 
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Equations (1) and (2) estimated upon the purely domestic sub-sample of 24 firms 
across 60 firm years, excluding several industry variables as in the multinational sample 
and excluding FGNRATIOtj which is zero for all domestic firms by definition, the results 
are as follows: 
USTUSAtj = 0.178016 – 0.032199*LNDCTESOtj + 0.074194*SIZEtj , 
       (1.117492)   (-2.027787)    (3.920905)          
sec = 0.952727, R2 = 0.643066; Equation (1) 
USTUSStj = 0.028135 – 0.011671*LNDCTESOtj + 0.011453*SIZEtj  
       (0.683889) (-2.871883)    (2.249052)   
sec = 0.940083, R2 = 0.342119; Equation (2) 
The results of the parameter estimates for these two equations upon the bifurcated 
sample illustrate substantial differences between these two subsamples one of 
multinational firms and another consisting of purely domestic firms.   
Within the panel of multinational firms, coefficient estimates on the tax variable 
LNDCTESOtj point to a larger positive effect upon the dependent variable in both 
equations in comparison to those estimated from the full sample.  Even so, for the 
equation (1) the R2 coefficient of correlation at 0.07 is indicative of lower explanatory 
power upon variation within the dependent variable USTUSAtj compared to the whole 
sample, which may be due in part to the reduction in bifurcated sample size.  The 
overall equation exhibits low statistical significance as the null hypothesis that all the 
coefficients are not significantly different from zero can be rejected at only a very low 
level of significance based on the F-statistic calculated for Equation (1) as estimated 
upon the subsample of multinational firms.   
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Also for the multinational subset of firms, the combined explanatory power of the 
predictor variables for equation (2) is very significant for the overall equation.  The null 
hypothesis of all the coefficients being not significantly different from zero is easily 
rejected at a high level of significance with the F-statistic.  The coefficient on 
LNDCTESOtj is highly significant, along with high significance for the positive coefficient 
on FNGRATIOtj.  In fact, the coefficient on FNGRATIOtj, the ratio of foreign to global 
sales for each firm year observation, is positive over the estimated equation (2) for the 
full sample and both equations (1) and (2) for the multinational samples.  This ratio has 
no meaning for the sample of purely domestic firms.   , this variable representing in part 
the extent of global operations on the part of each multinational firm is consistently 
positive as well for equation (2), which has as its dependent variable current US taxable 
income scaled by US sales.   
To various degrees, in every estimation of equation (2) increased foreign 
operations are associated with increased US taxable return on sales.  One explanation 
for this finding might be that along with a greater extent of multinational operations 
these firms also experience increased opportunities to shift their foreign income back 
into the United States to take advantage of tax benefits which have become available as 
the result of the employee exercise of stock options, which effectively lower the tax 
rates that shifted or repatriated income will face upon its arrival here in the US.   
It is much harder to move assets around the world that it is to move income 
around the world through the various income shifting techniques.  The coefficients on 
FGNRATIOtj estimated on equation (1) against US taxable return on US long term 
assets are insignificant for both the full sample and the purely multinational subset of 
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firms.  This is inconsistent with growing opportunities for cross border income shifting 
based on the extent of foreign sales.  Alternatively, it may also be a reflection of 
measurement error in the variable foreign sales as firms designated as foreign sales 
their US export sales.   
Both equations (1) and (2) estimated for the domestic sample of firms, showed 
substantially higher R2 values of 0.64 and 0.32 respectively.  These are firms that due to 
their lack of international operations are incapable of engaging in cross-border 
multinational income shifting through any majority-owned foreign subsidiaries.  
Increased profitability as measured by current tax expense scaled by either domestic 
long-term assets or domestic sales seems to be a function of firm size and industry 
affects among these domestic firms.  The high explanatory power of these two 
equations as compared to those estimated on multinational samples in terms of R2 
suggest that the set of factors which contribute to variation in profitability between 
multinational firms is larger and perhaps more complex than those needed to explain 
variations in profitability between purely domestic firms in the US.   
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
It was first hypothesized that firms with the greatest tax benefits from stock 
options would display the greatest level of domestic current taxable return on domestic 
assets and/or domestic current taxable return on domestic sales.  Current tax expense 
is reported without any reduction for the tax benefits of stock option exercise, therefore 
it reflects a measure of profitability for a purely domestic firm as well as a measure of 
both profitability and current income recognized within the US by multinational 
corporations.  Evidence of a relationship between increasing tax benefits accruing to 
firms from the employee exercise of stock options, and increased US profitability was 
very significant from a statistical standpoint.  As to explanatory power of stock option tax 
benefits with respect to cross-border income shifting from the standpoint of practical 
importance, since the dependent variables were each operationalized as quasi-financial 
ratios: taxable return on US assets and taxable return on US sales, a slow percentage 
growth in these ratios of US profitability, particularly if associated with greater tax 
benefits from stock option deductions, would be meaningful evidence for support of H1.  
Increasing measures of US taxable return ratios in the presence of increased tax 
benefits from employee stock options operating to effectively reduce corporate tax rates 
for these firms provides evidence consistent with either reduced income shifting out of 
the US and/or the shifting of foreign income into the United States in support of the 
acceptance of Hypothesis 1.   
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While the significant positive coefficients on FGNRATIOtj over estimations of 
equation (2) might suggest that a firm’s opportunities to shift income internationally 
grown as the ratio of foreign sales to global sales increases with expanding foreign 
operations, an alternative explanation might be that increasing US export sales drive the 
increase in US tax expense even as these US export sales were classified as foreign 
sales.  If the amount of US export sales classified as foreign sales is sufficiently large, it 
would certainly bias the results in favor of a finding that income is being shifting into the 
US due to systemic measurement error within this variable.  While the extent of any 
such bias is unknown, if the results are biased in this fashion then this would call into 
question any conclusions drawn based on equation (2) where the dependent variable is 
taxable income as a proportion of US sales which would also show systemic 
measurement errors due to the classification of US export sales if in fact the problem is 
widespread among sample firm years.   
Therefore, more reliable conclusions about possible income shifting can be 
drawn from Equation (1) where current tax expense as a ratio of US long term assets 
was the dependent variable.  The reason for this expectation of greater internal validity 
for parameters estimated for Equation (1) is two-fold.  First, any material changes to the 
amount of a firm’s long term US assets, even if in response to changing tax incentives 
would not generally be instantaneous.  Even if US long term asset values fluctuate in 
response to changing tax incentives, such asset value changes would occur with a 
considerable response lag time.  For this reason, the effect of income shifting into the 
US upon the dependent variable in Equation (1) would be reflected in the current tax 
expense numerator while the denominator, comprised of long term US assets, would 
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remain relatively more stable even in the presence of cross border income shifting by a 
firm. 
Conversely, evidence of income shifting behavior, particularly tax motivated 
transfer price manipulations by a firm, would be likely to affect both the numerator and 
denominator of the dependent variable in Equation (2).  Income shifting into the United 
States would inflate the numerator for increased current taxes due on the shifted 
income, while the denominator would likely also change from an increase to US sales 
revenue due to tax motivated transfer price manipulation designed to increase US 
income.  At best, USTUSStj is a noisy proxy variable with which to measure the latency 
of income shifting.  Even if the evidence obtained from Equation (1) is more reliable for 
drawing inferences about these firms, the results from Equation (2) show a very high 
level of significance across the full and multinational samples for the coefficients on 
LNDCTESOtj in further support of H1. 
An alternative explanation to Hypothesis 1 for these results could be that 
multinational firms are just more profitable than their domestic counterparts and it is this 
fact alone that drives any observed increase in the ratio US current taxes to assets?  If 
multinational firms were merely more profitable, wouldn’t the market reward these 
winning firms with higher and higher stock prices which would as a consequence, 
increase the amount of compensation deductions resulting from employees exercising 
their options with larger gains in excess of strike prices?  There are two reasons to 
discount this particular alternative explanation for the findings.  First, previous research 
points to multinational firms increasing global operations and profit margins outside the 
US without increasing overall global profitability (Grubert, 2012).  Second, if the 
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observed level of US profitability measured by US taxable return on US Long term 
assets was due only to inherently greater profitability on the part of multinational firms, 
then the coefficient on FGNRATIOtj should have been positive and significant as 
multinational operations even if only related to US exports, would have been associated 
with increased profitability as measured by the dependent USTUSAtj.  The coefficient on 
FGNRATIOtj was insignificant upon each estimation of Equation (1) so that greater 
profitability on the part of multinational firms can be rejected in favor of increased return 
on long term domestic assets due to income shifting into the US by multinational firms 
facing tax motivated income shifting incentives.  The income shifting incentives for these 
firms are the opposite of a more typical firm due to the effectively lower rates these 
option intensive firms face due to the extent of stock options exercised by their 
employees.  Since this behavior is exogenously determined from the standpoint of these 
firms it is similar in nature to tax rate reductions which would also be exogenously 
determined by government.   
Sufficient evidence exists within this study to reject the null hypothesis of no 
income shifting and instead to conclude that option intensive firms in the 1990’s 
engaged in cross border income shifting, leading to the acceptance of H1.  Hypothesis 
2, which was essentially that option intensive multinational firms would show higher US 
profitability than shown by their option intensive purely domestic counterparts, cannot 
be supported by the evidence provided by these equations estimated on either the full 
sample or the bifurcated samples.  Evidence of greater profitability on the part of 
multinational firms compared to their purely domestic counterparts was provided by the 
estimates of Equation (2) as the coefficient on FGNRATIOtj was both positive and 
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significant for both the full sample and the multinational sample.  However due to the 
potential measurement errors inherent in FGNRATIOtj due to US export sale 
classification; I am reluctant to conclude that the evidence provided is sufficient to 
support H2.   
The results of bifurcating the sample into multinational and domestic subsamples 
generate additional implications for future research.  The much larger coefficients of 
determination resulting from the estimation of the purely domestic sample as compared 
to either the multinational sample or the full sample causes me to question the nature of 
the additional complexity within the US profitability of firms with multinational operations.  
Could the introduction of additional control variables increase the predictive ability of the 
regression equations and lead to a better understanding of the effects of stock option 
intensity on cross border income shifting?  While the current study included those 
variables which previous research had documented as important to corporate income 
shifting behavior, other factors probably contribute to corporate profitability even if they 
have not been shown to contribute to the understanding of firm income shifting 
behavior. 
Additionally, although I believe that in substance the effect of stock option 
deductions is essentially equivalent to a reduction in statutory rates individually faced by 
each firm, the actual form of these stock options remains a tax shield and a deduction 
against corporate income to the firm.  If indeed the stock option tax benefit variable is a 
good proxy for a hypothetical corporate tax rate deduction on an individual firm basis, its 
estimation may have included significant noise within that estimation.  Regression 
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equations (1) and (2) in total explain less than 15% of the variation in their respective 
dependent variables.  
If stock option deductions are indeed essentially equivalent to a statutory rate 
deduction, perhaps they are in the nature of temporary tax rate reductions rather than 
actual long term permanent rate reductions.  The importance of this distinction is with 
respect to any contribution by this research to the larger question of whether US 
corporate income taxes are too high relative to our non-US national competitors in the 
global economy.  Beyond the scope of this discussion is the possibility that tax benefits 
from stock option exercise are in the nature of transitory benefits.  Such transitory 
benefits were initially described by Milton Friedman.  According to his permanent 
income hypothesis, transitory tax benefits would be less likely to change firm behavior 
(Friedman, 1992).  
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Appendix A 
Firms Comprising the NASDAQ 100 Index on May 30, 2001 
Apple Inc.  AAPL  
Abgenix Inc ABGX 
Adobe Systems Incorporated  ADBE  
ADC Telecommunications ADCT 
Adelphia Communications Corporation ADELQ 
Altera Corporation  ALTR  
Applied Materials Inc.  AMAT  
Applied Micro Circuits Corporation AMCC 
Amgen Inc.  AMGN  
Amazon.com Inc.  AMZN  
Ariba Inc ARBA 
At Home Corporation ATHMQ 
Atmel Corporation ATML 
Bed Bath & Beyond Inc.  BBBY  
BEA Systems Inc. BEAS 
Biogen Inc BIIB 
Biotet Inc.  BMET 
Brocade Communications Systems Inc BRCD 
Broadcom Corporation  BRCM  
BroadVision Inc BVSN 
Concord EFS  CEFT 
Chiron Corporation CHIR 
Check Point Software Technologies Ltd.  CHKP  
CIENA Corporation CIEN 
Comcast Corporation - Special Class A CMCSK 
CMGI Inc (MLNK:2008) CMGI 
Comverse Technology Inc CMVT 
CNET Networks CNET 
Conexant Systems Inc (Formerly Rockwell Semiconductor Systems) CNXT 
3Com Corporation COMS 
Costco Wholesale Corporation  COST  
Compuware Corporation  CPWR 
Cisco Systems Inc.  CSCO  
Cintas Corporation CTAS 
Citrix Systems Inc.  CTXS  
Dell Inc.  DELL  
Dish Network Corporation DISH 
Electronic Arts Inc.  EA  
eBay Inc.  EBAY  
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LM Ericsson Telephone Company ERICY 
Exodus Communications Inc EXDSQ 
Fiserv Inc.  FISV  
Flextronics International Ltd.  FLEX  
Genzyme GENZ 
Gemstar-TV Guide International Inc GMSTE 
Human Genome Sciences Inc HGSI 
IAC/InterActiveCorp IACI 
IDEC Pharmaceuticals Corporation IDPH 
Immunex Corporation IMNX 
Inktomi Corporation INKT 
Intel Corporation  INTC  
Intuit Inc.  INTU  
i2 Technologies Inc ITWO 
Sun Microsystems JAVA 
JDS Uniphase Corporation JDSU 
Juniper Networks JNPR 
KLA Tencor Corporation  KLAC  
Linear Technology Corporation  LLTC  
Level 3 Communications Inc LVLT 
Microchip Technology Incorporated  MCHP  
McLeodUSA Inccorporated MCLD 
Medimmune Inc. MEDI 
Mercury Interactive Corporation MERQE 
Metromedia Fiber Network Inc MFNX 
Millennium Pharmaceuticals Inc MLNM 
Molex Inc MOLX 
Microsoft Corporation  MSFT  
Maxim Integrated Products Inc MXIM 
Novell Inc NOVL 
NetApp Inc.  NTAP  
NVIDA Corporation NVDA 
Novellus Systems Inc NVLS 
Nextel Communications Inc NXTL 
Oracle Corporation  ORCL  
Palm Inc PALM 
Paychex Inc.  PAYX  
PACCAR Inc.  PCAR  
PMC Sierra Inc PMCS 
Parametric Technology Corporation PMTC 
PeopleSoft Inc. PSFT 
QUALCOMM Incorporated  QCOM  
QLogic Corp QLGC 
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Rational Sortware Corporation RATL 
RF Micro Devices Inc RFMD 
RealNetworks Inc RNWK 
Sanmina-SCI Corp SANM 
Starbucks Corporation  SBUX  
Siebel Systems Inc. SEBL 
Staples Inc.  SPLS  
PanAmSat Corporation  SPOT 
Smurfit-Stone Container Corp SSCC 
Tellabs Inc TLAB 
TMP Worldwide Inc. (Became Monster Worldwide, Inc 2003 MNST) TMPW 
VeriSign Inc.  VRSN  
VERITAS Software Corporation VRTS 
Vitesse Semiconductior Corporation VTSS 
WorldCom Inc WCOEQ 
Xilinx Inc.  XLNX  
XO Communications Inc XOXO 
Yahoo! Inc.  YHOO  
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Appendix B  
Output from E-Views Statistical Analysis Software Package 
OLS Fixed Effects Panel Regression Model Time Series Dummy Variables: Equation (1)     
 
Dependent Variable: USTUSA   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/15/12   Time: 13:07   
Sample: 1 396    
Included observations: 319   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.269280 0.319341 0.843238 0.3998 
LNDCTESO 0.062839 0.019014 3.304858 0.0011 
SIZE 0.032676 0.027937 1.169638 0.2431 
FGNRATIO -0.157539 0.161402 -0.976068 0.3298 
SIC23 -0.605765 0.359549 -1.684790 0.0931 
SIC26 0.594509 0.364113 1.632759 0.1036 
SIC28 0.668122 0.269546 2.478692 0.0137 
SIC35 0.283042 0.266944 1.060305 0.2899 
SIC36 0.425415 0.263191 1.616374 0.1071 
SIC37 0.259435 0.437615 0.592840 0.5537 
SIC38 0.244484 0.310998 0.786128 0.4324 
SIC48 0.852834 0.266420 3.201082 0.0015 
SIC53 0.844425 0.351200 2.404398 0.0168 
SIC57 0.317578 0.350331 0.906510 0.3654 
SIC58 0.716262 0.350830 2.041621 0.0421 
SIC59 0.846324 0.304365 2.780625 0.0058 
SIC60 0.202207 0.350279 0.577274 0.5642 
SIC73 0.503141 0.258592 1.945698 0.0526 
DUM1997 0.149938 0.087934 1.705108 0.0892 
DUM1998 0.121157 0.084417 1.435225 0.1523 
DUM1999 0.061560 0.078664 0.782572 0.4345 
     
     R-squared 0.231359    Mean dependent var 0.311001 
Adjusted R-squared 0.179772    S.D. dependent var 0.545487 
S.E. of regression 0.494028    Akaike info criterion 1.491116 
Sum squared resid 72.73106    Schwarz criterion 1.738981 
Log likelihood -216.8330    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.590104 
F-statistic 4.484863    Durbin-Watson stat 1.217456 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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OLS Fixed Effects Panel Regression Model Time Series Dummy Variables: Equation (2)     
 
Dependent Variable: USTUSS   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/15/12   Time: 13:11   
Sample: 1 396    
Included observations: 341   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.008737 0.058523 -0.149294 0.8814 
LNDCTESO 0.013107 0.003364 3.896417 0.0001 
SIZE 0.003506 0.004982 0.703723 0.4821 
FGNRATIO 0.091279 0.029201 3.125932 0.0019 
SIC23 -0.006351 0.066320 -0.095758 0.9238 
SIC26 0.032101 0.067002 0.479112 0.6322 
SIC28 0.022989 0.049172 0.467523 0.6404 
SIC35 0.027549 0.049227 0.559629 0.5761 
SIC36 -0.012112 0.048504 -0.249700 0.8030 
SIC37 0.054330 0.080692 0.673302 0.5012 
SIC38 -0.036392 0.057361 -0.634433 0.5263 
SIC48 0.081633 0.048799 1.672838 0.0953 
SIC53 0.100516 0.064846 1.550064 0.1221 
SIC57 0.021134 0.064682 0.326738 0.7441 
SIC58 0.049605 0.064766 0.765917 0.4443 
SIC59 0.088630 0.056173 1.577785 0.1156 
SIC60 -0.017638 0.064673 -0.272730 0.7852 
SIC73 0.040450 0.047549 0.850699 0.3956 
DUM1997 0.021430 0.015800 1.356360 0.1759 
DUM1998 0.011595 0.015089 0.768474 0.4428 
DUM1999 0.001997 0.014069 0.141935 0.8872 
     
     R-squared 0.263636    Mean dependent var 0.076162 
Adjusted R-squared 0.217613    S.D. dependent var 0.103136 
S.E. of regression 0.091227    Akaike info criterion -1.891332 
Sum squared resid 2.663140    Schwarz criterion -1.655351 
Log likelihood 343.4722    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.797314 
F-statistic 5.728380    Durbin-Watson stat 1.207335 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Results of LM Tests for Serial Correlation OLS Residuals: Equations (1) and (2) 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation Lagrange Multiplier Test 
Equation (1) OLS  
     
     F-statistic 32.66715    Prob. F(2,296) 0.0000 
Obs*R-squared 57.67967    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0000 
     
      
 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation Lagrange Multiplier Test 
Equation (2) OLS  
     
     F-statistic 30.87061    Prob. F(2,318) 0.0000 
Obs*R-squared 55.44237    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0000 
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First-Order Autoregressive OLS Panel Regression Fixed Effects Model: Equation (1)     
 
Dependent Variable: USTUSA   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/28/12   Time: 16:04   
Sample (adjusted): 2 396   
Included observations: 287 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 14 iterations  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LNDCTESO 0.044230 0.022490 1.966638 0.0503 
SIZE 0.068140 0.029786 2.287653 0.0229 
FGNRATIO -0.106405 0.227953 -0.466787 0.6410 
SIC23 0.174046 0.423747 0.410731 0.6816 
SIC26 0.569249 0.434747 1.309379 0.1915 
SIC28 0.592628 0.230844 2.567220 0.0108 
SIC35 0.102704 0.246442 0.416746 0.6772 
SIC36 0.330098 0.220619 1.496232 0.1358 
SIC37 0.771752 0.967002 0.798088 0.4255 
SIC38 0.136196 0.324403 0.419837 0.6749 
SIC48 0.912789 0.277349 3.291116 0.0011 
SIC53 0.854959 0.394780 2.165661 0.0312 
SIC57 0.212578 0.378764 0.561241 0.5751 
SIC58 0.591383 0.375135 1.576452 0.1161 
SIC59 0.895948 0.302662 2.960228 0.0034 
SIC60 0.013400 0.393185 0.034080 0.9728 
SIC73 0.449362 0.202287 2.221405 0.0272 
DUM1997 0.179854 0.079913 2.250629 0.0252 
DUM1998 0.137737 0.076046 1.811234 0.0712 
DUM1999 0.081592 0.059074 1.381199 0.1684 
AR(1) 0.506141 0.054738 9.246691 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.391947    Mean dependent var 0.325013 
Adjusted R-squared 0.346229    S.D. dependent var 0.565780 
S.E. of regression 0.457468    Akaike info criterion 1.344135 
Sum squared resid 55.66765    Schwarz criterion 1.611902 
Log likelihood -171.8834    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.451452 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.026714    
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .51   
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First-Order Autoregressive OLS Panel Regression Fixed Effects Model: Equation (2) 
Dependent Variable: USTUSS   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/28/12   Time: 16:01   
Sample (adjusted): 2 396   
Included observations: 313 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 10 iterations  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LNDCTESO 0.007006 0.003753 1.866794 0.0629 
SIZE 0.011568 0.005121 2.258792 0.0246 
FGNRATIO 0.082471 0.038827 2.124062 0.0345 
SIC23 0.126269 0.075321 1.676413 0.0947 
SIC26 0.095159 0.076521 1.243571 0.2147 
SIC28 0.057684 0.039034 1.477779 0.1405 
SIC35 0.055648 0.043293 1.285371 0.1997 
SIC36 0.023229 0.038650 0.601012 0.5483 
SIC37 0.157343 0.165067 0.953205 0.3413 
SIC38 0.010400 0.057418 0.181131 0.8564 
SIC48 0.153787 0.048176 3.192210 0.0016 
SIC53 0.114340 0.070435 1.623353 0.1056 
SIC57 0.052756 0.067521 0.781334 0.4352 
SIC58 0.082236 0.067104 1.225499 0.2214 
SIC59 0.152652 0.054119 2.820689 0.0051 
SIC60 -0.009602 0.069589 -0.137982 0.8903 
SIC73 0.073924 0.035813 2.064163 0.0399 
DUM1997 0.016274 0.013839 1.175980 0.2406 
DUM1998 0.004195 0.013365 0.313846 0.7539 
DUM1999 0.003470 0.010603 0.327240 0.7437 
AR(1) 0.471725 0.053532 8.812039 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.414795    Mean dependent var 0.077683 
Adjusted R-squared 0.374712    S.D. dependent var 0.105821 
S.E. of regression 0.083678    Akaike info criterion -2.058950 
Sum squared resid 2.044576    Schwarz criterion -1.807607 
Log likelihood 343.2257    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.958507 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.944122    
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .47   
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EGLS Estimation Using Panel Weights: Equation (1) 
 
Dependent Variable: USTUSA   
Method: Panel EGLS (Period SUR)  
Date: 12/03/12   Time: 12:42   
Sample: 1997 2000   
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 89   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 319  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.325457 0.379276 0.858100 0.3915 
LNDCTESO 0.041090 0.017540 2.342668 0.0198 
SIZE 0.027775 0.027041 1.027165 0.3052 
FGNRATIO -0.007588 0.179349 -0.042307 0.9663 
SIC23 -0.718941 0.459801 -1.563594 0.1190 
SIC26 0.527535 0.470238 1.121849 0.2628 
SIC28 0.583535 0.344390 1.694404 0.0912 
SIC35 0.251775 0.341562 0.737130 0.4616 
SIC36 0.416460 0.335663 1.240706 0.2157 
SIC37 0.326254 0.569594 0.572782 0.5672 
SIC38 0.206770 0.398959 0.518274 0.6047 
SIC48 0.732187 0.342280 2.139145 0.0332 
SIC53 0.754737 0.453622 1.663800 0.0972 
SIC57 0.220656 0.452668 0.487456 0.6263 
SIC58 0.654551 0.452910 1.445212 0.1494 
SIC59 0.718614 0.392336 1.831631 0.0680 
SIC60 -0.009366 0.452676 -0.020690 0.9835 
SIC73 0.467732 0.331020 1.413000 0.1587 
DUM1997 0.104707 0.090856 1.152453 0.2501 
DUM1998 0.080445 0.061600 1.305918 0.1926 
DUM1999 0.056626 0.043032 1.315921 0.1892 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.144652    Mean dependent var 0.444451 
Adjusted R-squared 0.087246    S.D. dependent var 1.065026 
S.E. of regression 1.012382    Sum squared resid 305.4251 
F-statistic 2.519808    Durbin-Watson stat 1.967813 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000434    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.221161    Mean dependent var 0.311001 
Sum squared resid 73.69601    Durbin-Watson stat 0.795042 
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EGLS Estimation Using Panel Weights: Equation (2) 
 
Dependent Variable: USTUSS   
Method: Panel EGLS (Period SUR)  
Date: 12/03/12   Time: 12:46   
Sample: 1997 2000   
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 94   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 341  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.010755 0.072680 -0.147976 0.8825 
LNDCTESO 0.007368 0.003127 2.356550 0.0190 
SIZE 0.005135 0.004935 1.040668 0.2988 
FGNRATIO 0.083459 0.033546 2.487883 0.0134 
SIC23 -0.045651 0.089026 -0.512782 0.6085 
SIC26 0.033882 0.090055 0.376236 0.7070 
SIC28 0.002743 0.065967 0.041578 0.9669 
SIC35 0.009557 0.066038 0.144713 0.8850 
SIC36 -0.024371 0.064987 -0.375023 0.7079 
SIC37 0.055896 0.108526 0.515045 0.6069 
SIC38 -0.057552 0.077200 -0.745489 0.4565 
SIC48 0.042629 0.065601 0.649817 0.5163 
SIC53 0.078020 0.087915 0.887441 0.3755 
SIC57 0.006285 0.087741 0.071637 0.9429 
SIC58 0.032394 0.087847 0.368760 0.7126 
SIC59 0.062232 0.076069 0.818107 0.4139 
SIC60 -0.039534 0.087749 -0.450537 0.6526 
SIC73 0.020307 0.063961 0.317486 0.7511 
DUM1997 0.011790 0.014476 0.814466 0.4160 
DUM1998 0.002087 0.011721 0.178064 0.8588 
DUM1999 0.000709 0.010444 0.067848 0.9459 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.149019    Mean dependent var 0.575441 
Adjusted R-squared 0.095833    S.D. dependent var 1.044148 
S.E. of regression 0.992332    Sum squared resid 315.1111 
F-statistic 2.801839    Durbin-Watson stat 1.811549 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000080    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.247697    Mean dependent var 0.076162 
Sum squared resid 2.720785    Durbin-Watson stat 0.840365 
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EGLS Estimation Using Panel Weights: Multinational Sample Equation (1) 
 
Dependent Variable: USTUSA   
Method: Panel EGLS (Period SUR)  
Date: 12/09/12   Time: 09:09   
Sample: 1997 2000 IF FSALES>0   
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 76   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 259  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.056233 0.290009 -0.193900 0.8464 
LNDCTESO 0.053914 0.019010 2.836027 0.0049 
SIZE 0.018712 0.031961 0.585462 0.5588 
FGNRATIO 0.072067 0.232312 0.310218 0.7567 
SIC28 0.195245 0.223029 0.875424 0.3822 
SIC35 -0.085203 0.177927 -0.478862 0.6325 
SIC36 0.067795 0.166062 0.408251 0.6834 
SIC48 0.326756 0.220656 1.480843 0.1399 
SIC73 0.134535 0.157937 0.851829 0.3951 
DUM1997 0.133162 0.109349 1.217765 0.2245 
DUM1998 0.110245 0.072244 1.526006 0.1283 
DUM1999 0.059904 0.048945 1.223918 0.2221 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.068936    Mean dependent var 0.412967 
Adjusted R-squared 0.027472    S.D. dependent var 1.020377 
S.E. of regression 1.000609    Sum squared resid 247.3007 
F-statistic 1.662533    Durbin-Watson stat 1.895068 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.082498    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.117993    Mean dependent var 0.336754 
Sum squared resid 77.54782    Durbin-Watson stat 0.723978 
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EGLS Estimation Using Panel Weights: Domestic Sample Equation (1) 
 
Dependent Variable: USTUSA   
Method: Panel EGLS (Period SUR)  
Date: 12/09/12   Time: 09:14   
Sample: 1997 2000 IF FSALES=0   
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 24   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 60  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.178016 0.159300 1.117492 0.2692 
LNDCTESO -0.032199 0.015879 -2.027787 0.0480 
SIZE 0.074194 0.018923 3.920905 0.0003 
SIC28 0.474753 0.082786 5.734673 0.0000 
SIC35 0.371756 0.115946 3.206296 0.0024 
SIC36 0.299352 0.083555 3.582705 0.0008 
SIC48 0.607671 0.082349 7.379247 0.0000 
SIC73 0.365347 0.071751 5.091897 0.0000 
DUM1997 -0.097058 0.079734 -1.217268 0.2293 
DUM1998 -0.060475 0.072604 -0.832946 0.4089 
DUM1999 -0.018006 0.040733 -0.442044 0.6604 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.643066    Mean dependent var 0.909382 
Adjusted R-squared 0.570222    S.D. dependent var 1.396966 
S.E. of regression 0.952727    Sum squared resid 44.47674 
F-statistic 8.828033    Durbin-Watson stat 1.182437 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.549329    Mean dependent var 0.199831 
Sum squared resid 2.608336    Durbin-Watson stat 0.736637 
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EGLS Estimation Using Panel Weights: Multinational Sample Equation (2) 
 
Dependent Variable: USTUSS   
Method: Panel EGLS (Period SUR)  
Date: 12/09/12   Time: 09:12   
Sample: 1997 2000 IF FSALES>0   
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 81   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 280  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.027519 0.049734 -0.553324 0.5805 
LNDCTESO 0.009735 0.003332 2.921782 0.0038 
SIZE 0.003022 0.005502 0.549317 0.5832 
FGNRATIO 0.092633 0.039726 2.331821 0.0205 
SIC28 -0.024421 0.035809 -0.681969 0.4958 
SIC35 -0.004093 0.031899 -0.128296 0.8980 
SIC36 -0.046312 0.028621 -1.618093 0.1068 
SIC48 0.026503 0.033695 0.786574 0.4322 
SIC73 0.005717 0.027118 0.210823 0.8332 
DUM1997 0.013039 0.016485 0.790981 0.4297 
DUM1998 0.004531 0.013209 0.343026 0.7318 
DUM1999 -0.000954 0.011953 -0.079801 0.9365 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.130861    Mean dependent var 0.603176 
Adjusted R-squared 0.095187    S.D. dependent var 1.046775 
S.E. of regression 0.992491    Sum squared resid 263.9904 
F-statistic 3.668274    Durbin-Watson stat 1.768573 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000072    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.220115    Mean dependent var 0.085091 
Sum squared resid 2.565298    Durbin-Watson stat 0.822175 
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EGLS Estimation Using Panel Weights: Domestic Sample Equation (2) 
 
Dependent Variable: USTUSS   
Method: Panel EGLS (Period SUR)  
Date: 12/09/12   Time: 09:13   
Sample: 1997 2000 IF FSALES=0   
Periods included: 4   
Cross-sections included: 25   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 61  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.028135 0.041139 0.683889 0.4972 
LNDCTESO -0.011671 0.004064 -2.871883 0.0060 
SIZE 0.011453 0.005092 2.249052 0.0289 
SIC28 0.055781 0.019144 2.913727 0.0053 
SIC35 0.052983 0.029900 1.772036 0.0825 
SIC36 0.005079 0.020970 0.242229 0.8096 
SIC48 0.031445 0.019571 1.606732 0.1144 
SIC73 0.028882 0.017208 1.678387 0.0995 
DUM1997 -0.026150 0.019040 -1.373442 0.1757 
DUM1998 -0.015887 0.017043 -0.932188 0.3557 
DUM1999 -0.004738 0.009506 -0.498380 0.6204 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.342119    Mean dependent var 0.716760 
Adjusted R-squared 0.210543    S.D. dependent var 1.057974 
S.E. of regression 0.940083    Sum squared resid 44.18778 
F-statistic 2.600156    Durbin-Watson stat 1.269861 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.012655    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.196071    Mean dependent var 0.035177 
Sum squared resid 0.162789    Durbin-Watson stat 0.933210 
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